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Article
The Supreme Court’s Political Docket: How Ideology
and the Chief Justice Control the Court’s Agenda and
Shape Law
BENJAMIN JOHNSON
The Supreme Court is unique among federal courts in that it chooses—using
the writ of certiorari—which cases it will decide. Justice Brennan once noted that
this discretionary power is “second to none in importance.” This article examines
the institutional politics behind this certiorari process. Specifically, it uses an
original dataset of Justices’ agenda-setting votes from 1986 to 1993 to show how
Justices use the rules that govern certiorari to pursue ideological goals. In addition,
and in contrast to existing qualitative accounts, the data suggest some Justices
queue off of the Chief Justice’s vote giving the Chief’s vote outsized influence. After
analyzing the effects of politics at certiorari, the article considers possible reforms
that might lessen or at least channel the effects of Justices’ policy preferences. To
that end, the article offers a range of proposals to reform the certiorari process to
promote transparency, to improve efficiency, and to enhance the Court’s legitimacy.
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The Supreme Court’s Political Docket: How Ideology
and the Chief Justice Control the Court’s Agenda and
Shape Law
BENJAMIN JOHNSON *
INTRODUCTION
A common attack against courts is that they are “political.”1 One need
look no further than newly-inaugurated President Trump’s assertion that an
injunction against his executive order on immigration2 was “so political.”3
The President went on to say that he does not “ever want to call a court
biased, . . . but courts seem to be so political.”4 Politics at the Supreme Court
are no less divisive, but they are potentially more consequential, since they
may undermine the Court’s legitimacy5 and judicial review powers.6
Increasingly, Senate confirmation battles focus less on nominees’

*
Ph.D. Politics, Princeton University; J.D., Yale Law School. Thanks are due to Bruce Ackerman,
Ian Ayers, Brandice Canes-Wrone, Charles Cameron, Miguel de Figueiredo, Jim Fleming, David Forte,
Heather Gerken, Leslie Gerwin, Paul Kahn, Al Klevorick, Harold Hongju Koh, Noah Messing, Anna
Offit, Mark Osler, Nick Parrillo, H.W. Perry, David Rabban, Judith Resnik, Sarah Schindler, Alexander
Schwab, Alan Schwartz, Sepehr Shahshahani, Kenneth Starr, Sarah Staszak, Keith Whittington, and
Aaron Zelinsky as well as participants in seminars at the University of Texas, Princeton, and Yale. Any
mistakes that remain are solely my own.
1
Sometimes this is offered not as an indictment but as an observation. See Richard A. Posner, The
Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 32, 34 (2005) (introducing
his main thesis “which is that to the extent the Court is a constitutional court, it is a political body”).
2
Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8, 977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
3
Donald J. Trump, U.S. President, Speech to the Major Cities Chiefs Police Association (Feb. 8,
2017), in THE HILL (Feb. 8, 2017, 3:40 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/theadministration/318525-transcript-of-president-donald-trumps-speech-to-the
[https://perma.cc/3D3ERJH9].
4
Id.
5
See Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher D. Johnston, On the Ideological Foundations of Supreme
Court Legitimacy in the American Public, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 184, 184 (2013) (noting the widespread
agreement that the Court’s public legitimacy is rooted in its reputation as being “impartial, trustworthy,
and above . . . politics”). Compare id. at 193 (suggesting the Court’s public legitimacy may be less
dependent on apolitical procedures), with Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections
Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1648 (2000) (arguing the Court’s
conceptual legitimacy is “dependent on its conformity with law”).
6
See Hartnett, supra note 5, at 1718 (arguing that the Supreme Court is no longer a “passive” or
“neutral” institution because of its ability to decide which cases to hear (quoting RICHARD L. PACELLE,
JR., THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SUPREME COURT’S AGENDA: FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION 15 (1991) and DORIS MARIE PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 2 (1980))).
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7

qualifications than on their perceived politics. Legal scholars bemoan the
influence of politics at the Court,8 and Justices air similar concerns.9
Among the most opaque,10 consequential, and political decisions the
Court makes in any case is the first one: whether or not to take the case at
all.11 Justice Brennan called the power to make this decision “second to none
in importance,”12 while one scholar has gone far enough to suggest that “the
Supreme Court’s power to set its agenda may be more important than what
the Court decides on the merits.”13 And yet scholars are divided on the
question of whether or not the Justices actually use this power to advance a
political agenda, with answers ranging from always,14 to sometimes,15 to
7
See Stephen Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1189 (1988)
(hypothesizing that when the public begins to become frustrated with Supreme Court decisions, they use
the confirmation process to find candidates that share their values and “will read the Constitution not
according to some eccentric or extremist philosophy, but rather in the way that . . . the People demand͇ ;
Lee Epstein et al., The Changing Dynamics of Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees, 68 J. POL.
296, 296 (2006) (arguing that Senate confirmation hearings are conducted to ensure the nominee shares
the Senators’ values); Jonathan P. Kastellec et al., Polarizing the Electoral Connection: Partisan
Representation in Supreme Court Confirmation Politics, 77 J. POL. 787, 788 (2015) (evaluating whose
opinion matters in “how senators cast votes on Supreme Court nominees”).
8
E.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 6 (2014) (expressing his
“disappointment” with the Court’s decisions over the years, especially regarding their “[failure] to protect
people’s rights”); ERIC J. SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS: WHY THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT A COURT AND
ITS JUSTICES ARE NOT JUDGES (2012) (referencing in Preface the well-known criticism that the Justices
act as “politicians in robes” and introducing the argument that because the “Supreme Court does not
function as a true court,” it “prevents the American people and our elected leaders from resolving
[various] issues democratically”); see also Keith E. Whittington, Once More Unto the Breach:
PostBehavioralist Approaches to Judicial Politics, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 601, 606 (noting that many
scholars have concluded “that judicial decisions simply reflect the political preferences of a majority of
the Justices on the Court at any given time”).
9
See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128–29 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disparaging the
majority by ending his dissent claiming that while the Nation would never know who truly won the
election, clearly the Nation has lost their “confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of
law”); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority’s decision as “an act of will, not legal judgment”).
10
See Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court’s
Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 790 (1984) (calling the process “hopelessly
indeterminate and unilluminating”).
11
See id. at 710 (providing an overview of the different factions that criticize the cases the Supreme
Court hears and chooses not to hear).
12
William J. Brennan, Jr., The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI. L. REV.
473, 477 (1973). Similarly, Justice Marshall said that even the decision not to decide a case is “among
the most important things done by the Supreme Court.” Thurgood Marshall, U.S. Supreme Court Justice,
Remarks at the Second Circuit Judicial Conference (Sept. 8, 1978), in THURGOOD MARSHALL: HIS
SPEECHES, WRITINGS, ARGUMENTS, OPINIONS, AND REMINISCENCES 177 (Mark V. Tushnet ed., 2001).
13
Hartnett, supra note 5, at 1737.
14
See Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 293 (2005) (“[C]entral
to positive scholarship is the notion that the Justices are strategic in using their almost unlimited control
over their docket to manage their agenda along ideological terms.”).
15
See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE 274–82 (1991) (suggesting Justices care about case
outcomes on certain issues and utilizes certain decision modes depending on how strongly they care
about the outcome of the case); S. Sidney Ulmer, The Decision to Grant Certiorari as an Indicator to
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almost never. For all the concern generated by political decision making at
the Court, scholars have struggled to quantify the extent to which politics
influences the Court’s decisions, pin down where politics enters the
process,17 or define it in a way that can be measured. This Article proposes
a more rigorous inquiry based on the following definitions. Justices are
strategic in that they consider the likely outcome on the merits as they decide
how to vote at certiorari. They may be ideological in two senses. First, they
may have policy preferences that are more liberal or conservative. Second,
they may have judicial philosophies that tend to lead to liberal or
conservative outcomes. Justices make political decisions at certiorari when
they vote strategically and ideologically—in the first sense—to advance a
policy agenda.18
Political decision making that affects the agenda is related to, but distinct
from, ideological decisions on the merits or justifications and guidance in an
opinion. Motivated reasoning19 may apply in each circumstance, but they are
not equivalent. Rather, ideological politics at the agenda-setting stage is
something like evidence of premeditation. Justices choose to take these cases
so they can use them as vehicles for ideological advancement later.
This Article explores how politics infects the Court’s “shadow
docket,”20 the largest part of which is the set of decisions about petitions for
certiorari. Certiorari is a tool that the Court uses to take questions that it
wants to decide and dodge those it wants to avoid.21 This Article presents an
empirical examination of how ideology can and does influence the cert
process and the Court’s agenda for the term. The results matter because the
Court’s docket shapes the course of law, and as that docket shrinks, every
slot appropriated by Justices’ political votes is a slot unavailable for the
Court’s more apolitical agenda.
Decision “On the Merits,” 4 POLITY 429, 441 (1972) (noting a close correlation between agenda-setting
votes and votes on the merits).
16
DORIS MARIE PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 125–30
(1980); see also David R. Stras, The Incentives Approach to Judicial Retirement, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1417,
1430 (2006) (opposing the notion that “Justices are motivated solely by their own policy preferences”).
17
See, e.g., Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections
Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169, 188 (1968) (suggesting there are politics
everywhere).
18
Accordingly, the rest of the Article uses the terms ideological and political interchangeably.
19
See Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated
Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (2011) (describing
motivated reasoning as “the tendency of people to unconsciously process information—including
empirical data, oral and written arguments, and even their own brute sensory perceptions—to promote
goals or interests extrinsic to the decisionmaking task at hand”).
20
William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 4
(2015) (noting that many “criticize the Court’s merits cases for being political, unprincipled, or opaque.
But those criticisms may be targeted at the wrong part of the Court’s docket”).
21
LISA KLOPPENBERG, PLAYING IT SAFE: HOW THE SUPREME COURT SIDESTEPS HARD CASES AND
STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 4 (2001)
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The Court is very selective about the cases it takes. Since it grants so
few petitions, it tries to reserve spots on the docket for only important
cases.22 But exactly what makes a case sufficiently important is not always
clear. The Court offers only limited guidance to those who would seek the
writ, and in practice, the Justices do not rigorously adhere to any standards
regarding the “certworthiness” of petitions.23 The absence of clear standards
“exacerbates the ever-present tendency of the Justices to conceive of the case
selection process in political terms.”24 That is, whether a Justice finds a
petition to be worthy of certiorari is a function of how important the
substance of the case is and whether or not the case is likely to advance the
Justice’s ideological interests.
Accordingly, any careful, empirical study of agenda-setting at the Court
must account for both a case’s intrinsic certworthiness and ideological
effects that push in favor of or against granting the writ. This Article
develops tools to do just that.25 The only data needed to undertake the study
is a set of cert votes. Fortunately, Justice Blackmun saved all of his papers
from his time on the Court.26 Helpfully, Lee Epstein, Jeffrey Segal, and
Harold Spaeth scanned several years of docket sheets and internal
memoranda into PDF form and posted the data on the web at the Blackmun
Archive.27 For this project, the PDF records were hand-coded into useable
computer data.28 With this rich dataset, there is more than enough data to
pursue a rigorous empirical analysis of the cert process.
By carefully analyzing the Justices’ votes at the agenda-setting stage
during the early years of the Rehnquist Court, this Article provides empirical
support for two distinct claims. First, the Rule of Four,29 which governs the
cert process, empowers liberal and conservative coalitions to push cases onto
the docket for ideological reasons. For conservatives, the opportunity is to
push the law ever more to the right. For the liberals, the hope is to fill up the
docket with less important cases so the conservatives have fewer
22

See PERRY, supra note 15, at 34–36 (discussing the absence of a definition of what makes a case
certworthy and suggesting that the definition is “a case that [they] consider to be important enough to be
certworthy”).
23
Id. at 34–35 (suggesting that the “ambiguity of Rule 10 is not some unfortunate oversight by the
Justices” but instead that “[t]hey have intentionally enunciated murky criteria”).
24
Estreicher & Sexton, supra note 10, at 791.
25
The model presented builds on other models of voting at the Court or in legislatures. See, e.g.,
Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo
for the US Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 137 (2002) (using the Justices’ votes to
reverse or affirm at disposition); Joshua Clinton et al., The Statistical Analysis of Rollcall Data, 98 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 355, 356 (2004) (using congressional votes).
26
Harold Hongju Koh, Unveiling Justice Blackmun, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 9, 10–11 (2006).
27
DIGITAL ARCHIVE OF THE PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN (Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal &
Harold J. Spaeth eds., Washington University in St. Louis 2007), epstein.wustl.edu/blackmun.php?p=3
[https://perma.cc/U88C-SZUM].
28
Id.
29
PERRY, supra note 15, at 43–44.
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opportunities to work mischief or to convince a moderate Justice to vote with
them to collect a rare win.
Second, the empirical analysis highlights the role and influence of the
Chief Justice, who seems to have a large, and previously unnoticed, effect
on the composition of the Court’s docket. The Chief Justice’s vote has a
statistically significant effect on the voting behavior of five of the other
Justices even after accounting for ideology. This result is quite surprising as
it contradicts the qualitative evidence on the subject.30 Further, while there
is a growing awareness that the Chief Justice possesses largely
unexamined—and possibly unjustifiable—formal powers to shape the
judiciary,31 the Chief Justice’s influence over the docket is unexplored.32 The
customary privilege of voting first33 appears to give him an outsized impact
on the Court’s agenda. Since Justices vote ideologically, the Court’s docket
may come to reflect the Chief’s idiosyncratic political views instead of
hewing to the more neutral principles espoused in the Court’s rules.34
This Article is also helpful to better understand the stakes of current
fights over the Court. The politics over the Court should take seriously the
politics at the Court in every stage of the Court’s process. The core empirical
findings about the power of ideology and the Chief Justice strongly suggest
that personnel is policy, or in the case of the Court, personnel is law. Both
parties and aligned interest groups engaged in a pitched battle over the last
open seat on the Court, and there is every chance that one or more seats
could come open in the next few years. As the Senate and nation evaluate
potential Justices for the next seat, this Article makes clear that it is at least
as important to know how the nominee would take cases as it is to determine
how that person would dispose of cases. The implications extend beyond the
Court as well; most state supreme courts also control their agenda,35 and
these findings suggest politics may be at work across the states.
Finally, this Article offers tentative suggestions to amend the cert
process.36 Previous works address concerns that sometimes the Court takes
cases it should not and other times it passes on cases it should take.
Discerning exactly which cases the Court “should” or “should not” take is
beyond the scope of the present Article. Those who believe the Justices
30
See id. at 85–91 (referencing the Discuss List as an administrative process that is not strategically
manipulated by the Chief Justice).
31
See Judith Resnik & Lane Dilg, Responding to a Democratic Deficit: Limiting the Powers and
the Term of the Chief Justice of the United States, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1575, 1575–76 (2006) (explaining
the reality of the impact that the Chief Justice can have on American law).
32
Id. at 1577–78.
33
See PERRY, supra note 15, at 44 (specifying that when votes are required, they are done in order
of seniority from most senior to most junior Justice).
34
SUP. CT. R. 10.
35
E.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 1067 (1872); TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.001 (1987).
36
See infra Part IV (speaking of the problems that threaten the court’s legitimacy and the solutions
proposed to rechannel the political power).
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should just be umpires would presumably say the Court should take cases
without regard to ideology and not seek to re-make the law.37 In general
though, ideology may be a relevant or even necessary consideration under
different theories; however, it is harder to identify a theory that would award
the Chief Justice so much sway over the docket.
This Article proposes a range of specific changes to address the Chief’s
power and to harness the Justices’ willingness to reason ideologically at
certiorari.38 First, Congress or the Court could clarify the rules that govern
certiorari so that there are clearer rules. Second, the Court on its own
initiative or pursuant to a congressional regulation of the Court’s appellate
jurisdiction could take steps to promote transparency in the process.
Specifically, the Court could release the records of the certiorari votes within
a reasonable timeframe. Third, the Court could change the voting procedures
by amending the Rule of Four39 or altering the order in which Justices vote
in conference. Finally, Congress could create an external review body to
help the Court select cases.
The Article is organized as follows. Part I offers three examples of the
certiorari process at work. The different strategies and concerns displayed in
those examples are then considered alongside other possibilities in Part II.
That Part explains how Justices can—and sometimes do—take advantage of
the certiorari process to advance a policy agenda. Part III introduces the
empirical model and results, leaving policy recommendations for Part IV.
I.

THREE EXAMPLES

Before turning to the formal and statistical analysis, it is worth
considering three examples from the Blackmun Archive.40 Justices decide
how to vote on certiorari based in part on the intrinsic importance of the
issue or case presented and in part on the likely policy effects that would
result if the Court granted cert and decided the case. The three examples
presented here are consistent with different types of voting behavior that
follow from that assertion. First, some issues are so important that the Court
simply must take and decide the case regardless of the ideological effects.
Second, sometimes Justices want to try to keep cases—even important
37

Cf. Brett M. Kavanaugh, The Judge as Umpire: Ten Principles, 65 CATH. U.L. REV. 683, 685
(2016) (“At its core, in our separation of powers system, to be an umpire as a judge means to follow the
law and not to make or re-make the law.”). On the tensions with the umpire analogy in the context of the
Court, see Neil S. Siegel, Umpires at Bat: On Integration and Legitimation, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 701,
701–02 (2007). Similarly, Aaron Zelinsky has a thoughtful and historically minded criticism of the
judge-as-umpire metaphor. See Aaron S.J. Zelinsky, The Justice as Commissioner: Benching the JudgeUmpire Analogy, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 113, 113–14 (2010) (introducing the “judge-umpire” analogy
by explaining its history, intent, and inaccuracy).
38
See infra Part IV (proposing to channel or relocate political power within certiorari).
39
Congress could also require such a change as a “Regulation[]” of the appellate jurisdiction.
40
DIGITAL ARCHIVE, supra note 27.
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cases—off of the docket because they are concerned the Court will make a
decision that will move the law in a “bad” direction.41 Finally, sometimes
Justices are aggressive and take cases that do not seem important in order to
advance an ideological agenda.
Take first, Mistretta v. United States.42 The facts of Mistretta are
straightforward. John Mistretta sold cocaine to an undercover agent for the
DEA, and he was convicted for selling a controlled substance.43 He appealed
his sentence, which was set according to the newly enacted federal
sentencing guidelines promulgated by the Federal Sentencing
Commission.44 His appeal asserted that the new guidelines were
unconstitutional.45 A memorandum circulated to the Court noted that district
courts across the country were divided on whether the new guidelines were
constitutional or not, and noted that no matter how the Court resolved the
matter, “a large number of defendants will have to be resentenced.”46 That
large number was growing on a daily basis, and so it was important that the
Court act quickly.
Given the obvious importance of the case, the memorandum
recommended granting cert.47 All nine Justices agreed, and the Court granted
certiorari unanimously.48 Justice Scalia voted to grant cert even though he
ended up dissenting in the case.49 Given the 8-1 outcome, it is almost certain
he knew that he would be on the losing side, but plainly he recognized it
would be irresponsible for the Court to wait to decide this question.50
While Mistretta was so obviously important that ideological concerns
were rendered secondary, some cases are not so overwhelmingly important
that ideological considerations vanish entirely. When issues or cases appear
that carry significance, sometimes Justices worry that the Court—if it takes
the case—will decide the case in a way that will displease the Justices. Such
41

See infra text accompanying notes 46–47.
488 U.S. 361 (1989).
43
Id. at 370; Preliminary Memorandum for No. 87-1904 at 2–5 (June 2, 1988) (on file with
Washington University in St. Louis), http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/blackmunMemos/1988/GM1988-pdf/87-1904.pdf [https://perma.cc/XGV8-XJKJ].
44
The Commission was established under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 28 U.S.C. §§
991-998.
45
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 370–371.
46
Preliminary Memorandum for No. 87-1904, supra note 43, at 1–2, 11.
47
Id. at 11.
48
Docket Sheet, Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (No. 87-1904),
http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/blackmunDockets/1988/Paid/docket-87-1904.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
GTQ4-ETVB].
49
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 413–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
50
See Preliminary Memorandum for No. 87-1904, supra note 43, at 10–11 (Explaining that the
district courts have examined this issue and decided it over fifty times, and little would be gained from
waiting for a court of appeals to decide the issue. It explains further that the district courts have not been
able to reach a uniform result, so courts of appeals would likely have the same difficulty.); see also
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 361.
42
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Justices may then try to play defense. One possible example of this is
Murray v. Giarratano, where the Court held states do not have to provide
counsel in postconviction collateral proceedings in capital cases.51 The
memorandum summarizing the certiorari petition circulated to the Court
suggested the lower court decision requiring states to provide counsel
conflicted with the Court’s recent decision in Pennsylvania v. Finley.52 It
also noted the Fourth Circuit issued its opinion en banc, so it would have a
great deal of precedential force, and it would require Virginia to develop and
fund a system to provide attorneys for offenders. The memorandum
colorfully stated that “respondent’s arguments for why cert should not be
granted border on the absurd.”53 Unsurprisingly, the memorandum
recommended granting cert.54
Justice Blackmun’s own clerk wrote, in a two-page memorandum
appended to the memorandum, that she agreed that the petition “requires a
grant of cert.”55 She stated that “the only rationale for denial would be a
patently defensive one.”56 This “defensive denial” strategy is one through
which a Justice votes to deny a case because of the risk of making
unfavorable law.57 Justice Blackmun voted to deny certiorari, as did Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.58
Just as the certiorari process allows some Justices to play defense, at
times it also allows them to play offense. Consider Employment Division v.
Smith,59 which worked a sea change in Free Exercise jurisprudence.60 The
facts of the case were rather straightforward. Alfred Smith was a member of
the Native American Church, and as a part of a religious ceremony, he
ingested “a small quantity of peyote for sacramental purposes.”61 This single
use constituted a violation of his employer’s—a drug treatment center—

51

492 U.S. 1 (1989).
Preliminary Memorandum for No. 88-411, 4–5, 9 (Oct. 28, 1988) (on file with Washington
University in St. Louis), http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/blackmunMemos/1988/GM-1988-pdf/88411.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5JV-37BG]; see also Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (“[T]he
right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further.”).
53
Preliminary Memorandum for No. 88-411, supra note 52, at 11.
54
Id. at 12.
55
Id. at app. p.1. Her final recommendation was to “Grant (reluctantly)” Id. app. p.2.
56
Id. at app. p.1.
57
PERRY, supra note 15, at 198–207.
58
See Docket No. 88-411 (Aug. 31, 1988) (on file with Washington University in St. Louis),
http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/blackmunDockets/1988/Paid/docket-88-411.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
H5JV-37BG].
59
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
60
See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1109, 1111 (1990) (“The Smith decision is undoubtedly the most important development in the law
of religious freedom in decades.”).
61
Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 663 (1988).
52

2018]

THE SUPREME COURT’S POLITICAL DOCKET

591
62

employment policies, as well as of the laws of Oregon. The center fired
Smith, who then applied for unemployment compensation from the State of
Oregon.63 The Employment Division denied the application because Smith
had been fired for “misconduct.”64 The Supreme Court of Oregon overturned
this decision based on First Amendment Free Exercise concerns, and the
State appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Much of the story is well known and set out plainly in the Court’s
opinion. What is less well known is that the Court very nearly did not hear
this case. The case got the bare-minimum level of support necessary to make
it onto the docket, with Justice Blackmun casting the pivotal fourth vote in
favor of hearing the case.65 If Blackmun, who ended up in the minority,66
had simply withheld his vote, the Court would not have granted certiorari.
Thanks to Justice Blackmun, the Court granted cert and remanded the
case to Oregon for further consideration. Specifically, the Court wanted to
know whether Oregon recognized a religious-use exception to the state’s
criminal code for the consumption of peyote.67 In subsequent proceedings,
the Oregon court held that there was no state religious-use exception to the
relevant statute.68 Still, the Oregon court maintained that the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibited the state from denying
benefits to Smith for taking peyote as a part of a religious practice. The state
again appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, leading to perhaps the most
important and controversial Free Exercise case of the last several decades.69
But before the Court could write a landmark opinion, it must first take
the case, and this was not a foregone conclusion. One of Justice O’Connor’s
clerks authored a memo to the Court70 recommending it deny certiorari.
According to the memo, Smith was not the “best vehicle” to answer the
question presented, there was no clear circuit split, and “the impact and
62

See id. at 662–63, 672 (stating that the possession of peyote amounts to a felony under Oregon

law).
63

Id. at 663.
Id.
65
Cert. Voting Docket Sheet No. 86–496, (Dec. 2, 1986), http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/
blackmunDockets/1987/Paid/docket-86-946.pdf [https://perma.cc/XX8L-GHF4].
66
Smith, 485 U.S. at 674 (1988) (Blackmun, J., joining the Brennan dissent).
67
Id. at 673–74.
68
Smith v. Emp’t Div., 763 P.2d 146, 147–48 (Or. 1988), rev’d sub nom., Emp’t Div., Dep’t of
Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
69
See Gerard N. Magliocca, The Cherokee Removal and the Fourteenth Amendment, 53 DUKE L.J.
875, 956 (2003) (“Smith is one of the Rehnquist Court’s most controversial holdings, and the Justices are
still sharply divided on the issue.”); McConnell, supra note 60, at 1110–11 (noting that the Court held
religious beliefs do not excuse an individual from complying with other laws that a state is free to
regulate).
70
Drafting the memo was a part of the clerk’s job since Justice O’Connor was a part of the cert
pool. The cert pool and cert pool memos are more fully described in Part III, infra. See also Preliminary
Memorandum for No. 88–1213, at 12, (Mar. 17, 1989), http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/
blackmunMemos/1989/GM-1989-pdf/88-1213.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CWW-SUHR].
64
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precedential value of a holding by this Court . . . would be limited.”71 The
memo’s author has certainly been proven wrong about the impact of the
precedent,72 but most likely, the clerk could not anticipate such a sweeping
decision.73 Justice Blackmun’s clerk was a bit more cynical and suggested a
faction of the Court was more interested in making law than deciding a case.
In an internal memorandum, one of Justice Blackmun’s clerks noted that the
majority from Smith I “thought it would get to decide whether religious use
of peyote is protected by the [F]ree Exercise Clause against state criminal
prosecution.”74
The Smith II Court seemed to be focused on getting to answer a
particular question to make a particular change in the law. Smith II was
certworthy because of the law the majority could make—the law it knew it
could make—if the Court granted cert.75 That politics was at play is easy to
see from the voting patterns at cert. Smith provided the same facts and the
same question both times it came to the Court. The first time, Justice
Blackmun thought the question was worth resolving, but Justices O’Connor
and Stevens did not.76 When the case came back, Justice Blackmun saw that
the Court was likely to go in a direction he would not support, so in the
second case, he voted to deny cert.77 But Justices O’Connor and Stevens also
had new opinions about the possibilities of Smith.78 Though the Court had
no new facts and only a marginally clearer picture of the possibly relevant
state law, those two Justices changed their minds and voted to grant cert so
they could answer the question.
Smith shows how precarious the cert process can be. An enormous result
hinged on the cert vote of a Justice who would come to dissent in the case.
It also shows how politics is at play at cert, as Justices changed their minds
on how certworthy Smith was between Smith I and Smith II, even though
neither the facts nor the question changed. The only difference was that the
Justices had a different idea of how Smith II would come out given their
71

Id. at 12.
In response to the Court’s decision, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(a)-1 to -4 (noting that the government, through any law, cannot burden the First
Amendment freedom of religion).
73
Indeed, Justice O’Connor, for whom the clerk worked, concurred only in the judgment and wrote
a blistering concurring opinion that claimed that the majority’s holding “dramatically departs from
well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence, appears unnecessary to resolve the question presented, and
is incompatible with our Nation’s fundamental commitment to individual religious liberty.” Emp’t Div.,
Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 891 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
74
Preliminary Memorandum for No. 88–1213, supra note 70, at 12.
75
One of Justice Blackmun’s clerks made this point in an internal memo. The clerk said it was clear
that the majority in Smith I “thought it would get to decide whether religious use of peyote is protected
by the Free Exercise Clause.” Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
72
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deliberations in the first hearing. Smith II shows how the Court can grab a
case that is not that significant on its own and make law from ideology. The
Court did this even though it could have reached the same outcome without
working such a large change in Free Exercise jurisprudence.79
II. POLITICS AND THE RULE OF FOUR
The Rule of Four is perhaps the most famous minority-voting rule in
politics. When the Justices requested and received control over their docket
from Congress in 1925, there was a real concern that the Court would take
too few cases.80 In particular, Congress did not want the Court to focus too
narrowly on certain types of cases, leaving broad swaths of the legal
landscape unsupervised.81 The Justices responded that the Court already had
an institutional remedy for that problem in The Rule of Four.82 Under the
rule, it takes only four of the nine Justices to commit the Court to review a
case.83 The Rule provides ideological opportunities for individual Justices,
minority coalitions, the Court median, and the Court as an institution. It also
helps keep lower courts in line and expands the types of cases the Court
hears.84 This Part describes the current certiorari process and the strategic
opportunities the Rule of Four presents.
A. A Brief Overview of the Process
The Supreme Court has nearly complete control of its docket through
the certiorari process. However, the Court has not always had such power
over its docket. Until the Judges’ Bill in 1925, the Court was required to
decide all cases within its jurisdiction.85 The Judges’ Bill curtailed the
Court’s mandatory jurisdiction, though it was still technically supposed to
hear certain types of cases: for example, where a lower court struck down a
federal statute.86 The Court quickly began to treat this mandatory jurisdiction
similarly to its discretionary docket and limited review to only those cases
79

Smith, 494 U.S. at 891 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
John Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (1983).
81
See Ira P. Robbins, Justice by the Numbers: The Supreme Court and the Rule of Four—Or is it
Five?, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 12 (2002) (describing Justices’ testimony intended to allay concerns
that increased discretion would result in arbitrary dismissals).
82
Id.
83
E.g., Joan Maisel Leiman, The Rule of Four, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 975 (1957).
84
See Stevens, supra note 80, at 20 (noting that “the Rule of Four must inevitably enlarge the size
of the Court’s argument docket,” given that it allows cases to be heard even when a majority of Justices
deem the case “unworthy of review”).
85
See Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act of 1925, 42 HARV. L. REV. 1,
1 (1928) (“To enable the Court to cope with the growth in its business and to conserve its energies for
issues appropriate to the Supreme Bench, Congress by the Act of February 13, 1925, acceded to the
Court's desire for drastic limitations upon its jurisdiction.” (footnote omitted)).
86
Mark Tushnet, The Mandatory Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court—Some Recent Developments,
46 U. CIN. L. REV. 347, 347 (1977).
80
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87

with a “substantial federal question.” Congress continued to whittle away
at the mandatory parts of the Court’s jurisdiction, culminating in 1988 with
the removal of nearly all of the remaining mandatory jurisdiction.88 As a
result, nearly all parties seeking Supreme Court review of a lower court
decision must seek certiorari.
The cert process begins when one or more parties in a lower court files
a petition for a writ of certiorari after a final decision is made by the lower
court.89 The Court receives thousands of petitions every year. In the October
2015 term, the Court disposed of over 6,500 cert petitions,90 but that number
has often exceeded 8,000.91 Of this number, the Court will grant cert to only
about 1 percent of the petitions.92
Given the sheer volume of petitions, the Court has developed a
procedure for streamlining the cert process.93 Most Justices belong to the
“cert pool.”94 Chambers belonging to the pool divide up the work of reading
and summarizing the petitions between the clerks that work for the
participating Justices. When a petition arrives at the Court, the case is
assigned to one of the clerks in the pool. The responsible clerk reviews the
petition and writes a memo to be distributed to the chambers participating in

87

PERRY, supra note 15, at 29.
Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–352, § 1, 102 Stat. 662. Most of the remaining mandatory
docket involves cases under the Voting Rights Act or the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. See, e.g.,
Bethune-Hill v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 794, 797 (2017) (noting probable jurisdiction for
an alleged Voting Rights Act violation); Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1464, 1466 (2017) (noting
probable jurisdiction for an alleged Voting Rights Act violation); McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434,
1442, 1444 (2014) (noting probable jurisdiction for an alleged Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
violation).
89
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2012) (establishing the statutory basis for the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction).
90
The Supreme Court, 2015 Term — The Statistics, 130 HARV. L. REV. 507, 514 tbl.II(A) (2016)
[hereinafter 2015 Statistics].
91
See EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 312 (9th ed. 2007) (“[T]he Justices
consider and dispose of over eight thousand certiorari petitions each term . . . .”); The Supreme Court,
2009 Term — The Statistics, 124 HARV. L. REV. 411, 418 tbl.II(A) (2010) (noting that during the 2009
term, the Court disposed of 8,087 petitions).
92
The bulk of the petitions are filed in forma pauperis, and the Court granted only 12 of the nearly
5,000 such petitions in the 2015 term, or 0.2 percent. The Court is more open to taking cases off of its
paid docket, granting 69 of 1565 paid petitions, or 4.4 percent. 2015 Statistics, supra note 90, at 514
tbl.II(B).
93
F. Andrew Hessick & Samuel P. Jordan, Setting the Size of the Supreme Court, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
645, 703–04 (2009) (noting the process seeks “to avoid unnecessary redundancy” by dividing the work
up across chambers).
94
See Carolyn Shapiro, The Law Clerk Proxy Wars: Secrecy, Accountability, and Ideology in the
Supreme Court, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 101, 110 (2009) (describing the history and function of the cert
pool); Adam Liptak, Gorsuch, in Sign of Independence, is Out of Supreme Court’s Clerical Pool, N.Y.
TIMES (May 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/gorsuch-supreme-court-laborpool-clerks.html (reporting that currently, Justices Alito and Gorsuch are the only members of the Court
who are not members of the pool).
88

2018]

THE SUPREME COURT’S POLITICAL DOCKET

595

95

the pool. The memo describes the facts of the case, the procedural posture,
the arguments presented by all parties, and concludes with the author’s
recommendation of whether to grant or deny the petition.96 The memos are
often the only information about the petitions the Justices will have.97 Even
the most certworthy petitions get scant review at the preliminary stage.98
Once the memo is circulated, the next step is the creation of the “Discuss
List.”99 The Chief Justice circulates a list of cases to be discussed at the
following conference. Any Justice may add a case to the list. If no Justice
adds a particular case, cert is automatically denied.100 At the conference, the
Justices vote on whether or not to take the case. Justices may vote to grant,
deny, or to Join-3.101 Cases that get four grants or three grants and at least
one Join-3 get certiorari.102 Thus, the Join-3 vote is a sort of weak grant103
that functions as a grant in only certain circumstances. If three other Justices
vote to grant, then the Join-3 is effectively a vote to grant. If only two vote
to grant, then the Join-3 functions as a vote to deny. Interestingly, there is a
strong norm against discussing petitions before the conference, so Justices
do not build cert coalitions prior to conference.104

95
See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 233 (2001) (explaining that the clerks divide
up who should write each memo and then the memos are “circulated to the chambers whose clerks
comprise the pool”).
96
See David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the Certiorari
Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 973 (2007) (book review) (explaining the standardized format that law
clerks use to draft memoranda). Generally, the Court’s disposition on petitions for certiorari reflects the
pool memos’ suggestions. During the October Terms in 1984, 1985, 1991, and 1992, the Court agreed
with the pool memo on approximately 90 percent of petitions. Id. at 991.
97
See REHNQUIST, supra note 95, at 233–34 (2001) (noting that in the vast majority of cases, he
would only review the pool memo and his clerks’ annotations to it); David M. O’Brien, Join-3 Votes, the
Rule of Four, the Cert. Pool, and the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Plenary Docket, 13 J.L. & POL. 779,
801 (1997) (noting a similar admission from Justice Stevens).
98
Henry Hart estimated that a Justice spends less than twenty minutes in total on the nonfrivolous
petitions. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 88 (1959). Chief
Justice Hughes said that petitions received about three-and-a-half minutes of discussion at conference.
Edwin McElwain, The Business of the Supreme Court as Conducted by Chief Justice Hughes, 63 HARV.
L. REV. 5, 14 (1949).
99
See PERRY, supra note 15, at 85–89 (discussing the evolution, history, and mechanics of the Chief
Justice’s “Discuss List”).
100
GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 91, at 15 (“The cases that do not make the discuss list . . . are
automatically denied review without discussion or vote.”).
101
PERRY, supra note 15, at 48–49.
102
Id. at 43–44, 49.
103
One Justice called it a “timid vote to grant” and another said he used it for cases he “would vote
to grant, but that [he] wouldn’t put on the discuss list.” Id. at 167–68; see also Ryan C. Black & Ryan J.
Owens, Join-3 Votes and Supreme Court Agenda Setting 3 (June 8, 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1568389
[https://perma.cc/T2HL-4ZD4]
(suggesting the Join-3 reflects collegiality concerns generally and addresses a Justice’s uncertainty in a
particular case).
104
PERRY, supra note 15, at 147–49, 163.
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The guidelines for what makes a petition certworthy at the initial stage
are charitably described as imprecise,105 but such as they are, they are located
in Rule 10 of the Supreme Court’s Rules.106 The Rule emphasizes several
factors that are of special concern to the Court: resolving circuit splits,
clarifying federal law, deciding important questions, and rebuking lower
courts that misstate the Court’s precedent.107 It also specifically says that the
Court is not generally interested in righting wrongs in particular cases.108 If
the law is clear, the Court is not interested in taking the case. As Chief Justice
Vinson put it:
The Supreme Court is not, and never has been, primarily
concerned with the correction of errors in lower court
decisions. . . . The function of the Supreme Court is . . . to
resolve conflicts of opinion on federal questions that have
arisen among lower courts, to pass upon questions of wide
import under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United

105
106

One commentator calls them “tautological[].” PERRY, supra note 15, at 34.
This is Rule 10 in its entirety:
Considerations Governing Review on Certiorari
Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial
discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling
reasons. The following, although neither controlling nor fully measuring the
Court’s discretion, indicate the character of the reasons the Court considers:
(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict
with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important
matter; has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with a
decision by a state court of last resort; or has so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower
court, as to call for an exercise of this Court’s supervisory power;
(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal question
in a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort or of a
United States court of appeals;
(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an
important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this
Court, or has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with
relevant decisions of this Court.

A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists
of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.
SUP. CT. R. 10.
107
Id.
108
Id. There appears to be a bit of a fuzzy line between the Court’s stated desire to not be a court
of error correction and its concern to police lower courts that diverge from its precedents. The latter
would seem to be an error, and yet the Court expresses an interest in correcting it. The relevant distinction
seems to be between law and fact. The Court is unlikely to review a decision that misapplies Supreme
Court precedent to facts, but will review when a court misstates law.
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States, and to exercise supervisory power over lower federal
courts.109
Given the importance of the process and the interesting mix of discretion
and institutional rules, scholars have not been idle in studying the cert
process. There is wide agreement that splits, whether between lower courts
or between a lower court and the Supreme Court’s precedents, draw the
Court’s attention.110 Scholars also tend to agree that the Justices are
sophisticated voters at the cert stage.111 There is a rather robust finding that
Justices tend to vote to grant cert in cases where they reverse.112
Interestingly, previous work has not found such votes to be ideologically
motivated, though there is evidence that in cases where a Justice wants to
see a lower court affirmed, cert votes are focused on the likely outcome of
cases.113 And scholars have amassed qualitative and quantitative evidence
that Justices withhold their votes for cert when they worry the Court will
reach an unfavorable outcome if the Justices grant cert.114 Despite these
findings, scholars still dispute whether the Court really is outcome motivated
at the cert stage.115 The remainder of this Part describes possible strategies
Justices could—if motivated by outcomes—pursue at certiorari.

109
PERRY, supra note 15, at 36 (quoting Address of Chief Justice Vinson before the American Bar
Association, Sept. 7, 1949, 69 S. Ct. v, vi). Most formal models focus mainly on the supervisory power.
See, e.g., Charles M. Cameron et al., Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model
of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101, 101 (2000) (studying how the
certiorari decisions enforce the Court’s “doctrinal preferences . . . within the judicial hierarchy”); Jeffrey
R. Lax, Certiorari and Compliance in the Judicial Hierarchy: Discretion, Reputation and the Rule of
Four, 15 J. THEORETICAL POL. 61, 61–62 (2003) (developing a “formal model of the judicial hierarchy”
to better understand how certiorari allows the Court to “compel compliance” and determine “which
battles to fight with the lower courts”).
110
Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S.
Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 1120 (1988); Stras, supra note 96, at 981–83; see also
S. Sidney Ulmer, The Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions: Conflict as a Predictive Variable, 78 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 901, 906–11 (1984) (providing statistical data analyzing the Court’s conflicts); S. Sidney
Ulmer, Conflict with Supreme Court Precedent and the Granting of Plenary Review, 45 J. POL. 474,
474–77 (1983) (using statistical data to show the Court’s attention to circuit splits).
111
Gregory A. Caldeira et al., Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court, 15 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 549, 561–71 (1999); Jan Palmer, An Econometric Analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
Certiorari Decisions, 39 PUB. CHOICE 387, 393–96 (1982).
112
JAN PALMER, THE VINSON COURT ERA: THE SUPREME COURT’S CONFERENCE VOTES 59–62
(1990); PROVINE, supra note 16, at 107–10.
113
See Sara C. Benesh, Saul Brenner, & Harold Spaeth, Aggressive Grants by Affirm-Minded
Justices, 30 AM. POL. RES. 219, 221 (2002) (collecting studies to this effect).
114
See PERRY, supra note 15, at 198–207 (describing the existence of defensive denials in judging);
Mark V. Tushnet, Defensive Denials, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 256 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 2005); infra Part II.B.
115
Compare Friedman, supra note 14, with PROVINE, supra note 16, at 125–30, 172; see also Stras,
supra note 16, at 1430 (opposing the notion that “Justices are motivated solely by their own policy
preferences”).
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B. Defensive Denials
The most obvious feature of the Rule of Four is that it makes certiorari
contingent on the agreement of a defined number of Justices.116 Absent
ideology, the Justices would simply vote for cases they think are intrinsically
important and against those they think less so. But once Justices factor in
ideological concerns, they must weigh the ideological costs and benefits
against the importance of the case. If a Justice wants to take a case, then
voting to take the case is a meaningful step in that direction. Similarly,
voting to deny the petition makes it more likely the case will not be heard.
Stated this way, there is an obvious strategy: vote for what you like and
against what you dislike. But this intersects awkwardly with the Court’s
presumed obligation to take certain important cases.
When ideological considerations cause a Justice to vote to deny
certiorari in a case that is important enough that she would otherwise vote to
grant, the Justice casts what is called a “defensive denial.”117 The Giarratano
case mentioned in the introduction is one example.118 Another seemingly
clear instance of this strategy is Florida v. Riley.119
In Riley, the Court had to decide whether surveilling residential property
from a helicopter 400 feet above the ground constitutes a search under the
Fourth Amendment.120 The Court had previously ruled in California v.
Ciraolo that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy from “nakedeye observation of the curtilage by police from an aircraft lawfully operating
at an altitude of 1,000 feet.”121 The cert pool memo122 recommended a grant
because there was a split on the issue, and the increasing use of police
helicopters seemed to make resolution of this question worth the Court’s
time.123
116

Leiman, supra note 83.
See Udi Sommer, Beyond Defensive Denials: Evidence from the Blackmun Files of a Broader
Scope of Strategic Certiorari, 31 JUST. SYS. J. 316, 319 (2010) (defining a “defensive denial” as
occurring when a Justice votes to deny certiorari despite disagreeing with the lower court’s decision, as
they will likely lose on the merits). The defensive denial has been studied at length in the political science
literature. See generally Robert L. Boucher, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as Strategic
Decision Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson Court, 57 J. POL. 824 (1995)
(studying “the extent to which Justices consider the relative likelihood of winning on the merits when
deciding to grant or deny review,” and thereby, the prevalence of defensive denials); Caldeira et al., supra
note 111 (studying the extent to which Justices acted on certiorari petitions with the future decision on
the merits in mind).
118
Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989); see supra pp. 590.
119
488 U.S. 445 (1989).
120
Id. at 447–48.
121
476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986).
122
The author was a clerk for Justice White.
123
Preliminary Memorandum for No. 87-764-CSY at 7, (Jan. 25, 1988),
http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/blackmunMemos/1988/GM-1988-pdf/87-764.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
TJ5K-3SQN].
117
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Justice Blackmun’s clerk recognized that the split was sufficient so that
“cert would not be unwarranted.”124 But she also noted that Blackmun had
been in the dissent in Ciraolo, and presumed that the Justice “was not eager
to further curtail individuals’ privacy interest in being free from aerial
surveillance.”125 Given his policy preferences—and correctly predicting the
likely outcome in the case—she “recommend[ed] defensive denial.”126
Blackmun took her advice and voted to deny the petition.
Despite Blackmun’s strategic vote, the Court took Riley anyway. In what
will be a recurring theme throughout this Part, strategic voting can improve
the chances of a favorable outcome, but it does not guarantee such an
outcome. Blackmun’s vote made it less likely the Court would take Riley,
but the Court took the case anyway.
C. Aggressive Grants
In contrast to defensive denials, aggressive grants occur when a Justice
sees enough positive ideological potential in a case that the vote shifts from
deny to grant. In such an instance, the Justice can hope her cert vote pushes
a favorable—if not obviously certworthy—case onto the docket where the
Court is likely to make a decision more to that Justice’s liking. Once again,
there is a conflict between the aggressive grant and the desire to focus on
“important” cases. Where the defensive denial aims to prevent the Court
from taking a case it “should,” the aggressive grant attempts to get the Court
to take a case it “should not.” The previously described Employment
Division v. Smith127 appears to be one example of an aggressive grant. Recall
that in the pool memo, Justice O’Connor’s clerk recommended denying the
petition, but O’Connor and the other conservatives took the case anyway.
The aggressive grant is particularly appealing when there is only a
limited downside if the case turns out unfavorably. One possible example of
this phenomenon is South Carolina v. Gathers.128 In 1987, the Supreme
Court held in Booth v. Maryland that victim impact statements presented
during the sentencing phase of a capital case violate the Eighth
Amendment.129 The Court reasoned that information about a murder victim
that is “irrelevant to the [defendant’s] decision to kill,” but could undermine
“reasoned decisionmaking” by playing on jurors’ emotions violated the
Constitution.130 Justice Powell authored the opinion for a five-member

124

Id.
Id.
126
Id.
127
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
128
490 U.S. 805 (1989).
129
482 U.S. 496, 509 (1987).
130
Id. at 505, 509.
125
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131

majority. Justice White wrote a dissent signed by all dissenting Justices
and also signed Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion.132 Two years later,
Justice Powell had retired and been replaced by Justice Kennedy, who had
expressed a desire to overturn Booth.133 In Gathers, the conservatives took
their chance.
Gathers seemed like an unlikely candidate for cert. The case lacked
many of the features associated with a successful cert petition. There was no
split in the lower courts. There was no dissenting opinion below. The law
was clear. Internally, the recommendation from the clerk assigned to
summarize the petition for the Court recommended the Court deny the
petition “[u]nless the Court wishe[d] to reconsider Booth.”134 In a private
memo to Justice Blackmun, one of his clerks agreed the case was not
certworthy, but did say that if the conservatives wanted to overturn Booth,
“this case for them is as good as any.”135 When the Court met in conference
to decide whether to grant cert and take the case, four conservatives
(Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy), and only the four
conservatives, voted to take the case.136
In Gathers, essentially none of the Rule 10 factors were in play. What
was possible was that the replacement of Powell with Kennedy had opened
the door for the conservatives to establish their preferred reading of the law.
This situation was somewhat ideal from their perspective, as even if they
lost, the law would only remain the same. This was essentially a no-lose
proposition, even if they were not guaranteed a win. As it turned out, they
did not win. Though their cert strategy worked, and they got the case they
wanted onto the docket, the Court upheld Booth with Justice White voting
to leave Booth untouched.137
D. Minority-Enhancing Strategies
The Rule of Four is obviously a minority-voting rule (at least when there
are nine Justices on the Court). It stands to reason that the rule should benefit
minority coalitions. While this seems plausible, there has been little effort to
explain exactly what benefits the Rule provides to these coalitions. After all,
this only puts the case on the docket. Once taken, the majority will dispose
131

Id. at 497.
Id. at 515 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 519 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Preliminary Memorandum
for
No.
88-305-CSY 7
(Sept. 27, 1988),
http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/blackmunMemos/1988/GM-1988-pdf/88-305.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
5E7A-QSV6] (citing Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)).
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Id.
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Id.
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Cert. Docket Sheet South Carolina v. Gathers, No. 88-305, http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/
blackmunDockets/1988/Paid/docket-88-305.pdf [https://perma.cc/JV27-L992].
137
South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 812 (1989) (White, J., concurring) (“Unless Booth v.
Maryland is to be overruled, the judgment below must be affirmed. Hence, I join JUSTICE BRENNAN's
opinion for the Court.” (citations omitted)).
132
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of the case; so, it is a bit unclear what the actual benefit is. Put differently,
the minority cannot decide a case, write an opinion, or set any policy on its
own, which raises the question: what, if any, benefit is there to a minority
coalition from having the power to force a case onto the docket?
The Rule of Four provides different opportunities to minority coalitions
depending on prevailing conditions. The unifying feature of all of the
advantages is that the Rule of Four lets the minority force the Court to take
a case the majority wants to avoid. There are times where a minority
coalition can put the majority in a tight place politically. At other moments,
the minority might be able to take a case where they can peel off a member
of the usual majority coalition and actually win. The Rule of Four also allows
a minority of the usual winning coalition to push cases onto the docket to
promote an ideological agenda. Finally, and perhaps most intriguingly, the
Rule of Four might allow a minority coalition to clutter up the docket and
limit the ability of the majority to work mischief.
1. Political Hardball
Suppose conservatives make up a 5-4 majority on the Court. A lower
court decides a case on a hot political topic, and the Court majority does not
want to take the case because it will be forced to reach an unpopular outcome
or compromise on a matter of principle. If it is up to the majority, the Court
will deny certiorari and leave the matter alone. But the liberal minority can
force the Court to take the case anyway. Now, the conservatives must face
the choice they wished to avoid. They must now either give the progressive
Justices the policy they want or face the wrath of Congress.
A possible example of this phenomenon comes from Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber.138 The issue in that case involved the statute of
limitations for certain claims under Title VII.139 Specifically, Ledbetter sued
Goodyear for sexual discrimination, arguing that her negative performance
reviews were the result of sexual discrimination.140 A jury agreed with her,
but Goodyear appealed the outcome on the basis of the statute of
limitations.141 Goodyear argued that Ledbetter could not recover for
damages incurred prior to the 180-day window preceding Ledbetter’s EEOC
claim, and since any improper discriminatory payment decision happened
long before that, the statute of limitations had lapsed before the EEOC
complaint was filed.142 Ledbetter argued that each paycheck that was less
than that received by a man was a separate act of discrimination.143 There
138

550 U.S. 618 (2007).
Id. at 623.
140
Id. at 622.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
See id. (“Ledbetter introduced evidence that during the course of her employment several
supervisors had given her poor evaluations because of her sex, that as a result of these evaluations her
139
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was a circuit split on this issue, and the Court granted certiorari on June 26,
2006, and set argument for that November.144
The politics of the issue were tricky. Ledbetter was a decidedly
sympathetic plaintiff. Ledbetter presented a challenge to the conservative
majority on the Court, as ruling against Ledbetter would be unpopular with
the public and with the new Congress that had just flipped to the Democrats.
Further, if it ruled against her, the Court could elevate this as an issue in the
upcoming 2008 presidential election, which could harm the Republicans’
chances to retain the White House.
There is little reason to believe the conservative majority should want to
take this case at this moment. Their preferred outcome would risk popular
and legislative backlash, and insofar as the Justices are concerned with
presidential elections,145 it threatened the conservatives’ preferred party.
This suggests that if they could have, they would have preferred to deny
certiorari and resolve the underlying circuit split at a later time. But under
the Rule of Four, the liberal bloc had the votes to force the case onto the
docket.
For the liberal bloc, Ledbetter was a win-win. If the conservatives wilted
under the political pressure, the result was an expansive reading of Title VII.
If the conservatives stuck to their principles, the result was political pressure
against the conservative majority, a possible legislative response that would
overturn the decision, and an increased chance the Democrats win the
following presidential election.
As it turns out, the conservatives ruled against Ledbetter in a decision
that was widely covered and was turned into “a cause celebre”146 by
“Democrats and legal groups on the left.”147 The case became an issue in the
2008 elections, and Ledbetter herself spoke at the DNC and was featured in
campaign commercials for then-Senator Obama.148 After Obama took office,

pay was not increased as much as it would have been if she had been evaluated fairly, and that these past
pay decisions continued to affect the amount of her pay throughout her employment. Toward the end of
her time with Goodyear, she was being paid significantly less than any of her male colleagues.”).
144
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 548 U.S. 903 (2006) (granting certiorari).
145
See Adam Liptak, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, No Fan of Donald Trump, Critiques Latest Term, N.Y.
TIMES (July 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/11/us/politics/ruth-bader-ginsburg-no-fan-ofdonald-trump-critiques-latest-term.html [https://perma.cc/6QBA-6XZ8] (“‘I can’t imagine what this
place would be—I can’t imagine what the country would be—with Donald Trump as our president,’ she
said. ‘For the country, it could be four years. For the court, it could be—I don’t even want to contemplate
that.’” (quoting Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg)).
146
Robert Barnes, Exhibit A in Painting Court as Too Far Right, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/04/AR2007090401900.html
[https://perma.cc/UY64-YZAK].
147
Id.
148
Mary Jo Shafer, Jacksonville’s Ledbetter Featured in Obama Ad, ANNISTON STAR, Sept. 28,
2008.
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the Democrats passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, which
amended Title VII to effectively reverse the Supreme Court’s decision.150
Given this largely foreseeable sequence of events, one would imagine
the conservative majority would have preferred to take a pass on Ledbetter.
While we cannot know for sure, since the cert votes have not been made
publicly available, it would not be surprising if the four more liberal
members of the Court pushed the case onto the docket. Ledbetter points to a
set of circumstances where the Rule of Four lets the minority coalition play
political hardball and put the majority between a rock and a hard place.
2. Forcing the Reluctant Median
For the past several decades at least, legal scholars and political
scientists have generally thought of the Court as breaking down along a
left-right continuum.151 While this often gets reduced, especially in the
popular press, to the assertion that there are two blocs that usually vote in
lockstep, there is also the recurring theme of the “swing” Justice. Since the
retirement of Justice O’Connor, most observers think that Justice Kennedy
is the pivotal member of the Court,152 who in many, if not most, cases votes
with the conservative faction.153
Imagine for a moment that this swing Justice is something of a free
agent, unbeholden to a liberal or a conservative bloc. If the other Justices
have a clear sense of what the swing Justice will decide to do in a particular
case, they can alter their cert votes accordingly by voting to grant in cases
where the median agrees with the swing Justice’s own preferred outcome.
In contrast, if the majority rule governed at cert, the swing Justice would be
able to set the agenda and decide the case as the pivotal voter in both rounds.
The median would not only be able to dictate the answers at disposition; she
would also be able to pick her own questions. That would be a tremendous
power for a single Justice.
149

Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–2, 123 Stat. 5.
See id. (“Congress finds the following: (1) The Supreme Court in [Ledbetter] significantly
impairs statutory protections against discrimination in compensation that Congress established and that
have been bedrock principles of American law for decades. The Ledbetter decisions undermines those
statutory protections by unduly restricting the time period in which victims of discrimination can
challenge and recover for discriminatory compensation decisions or other practices, contrary to the intent
of Congress.”).
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See, e.g., Kenneth W. Moffett, Four Predictions about President Trump’s Supreme Court,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
23,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2016/11/23/four-predictions-about-president-trumps-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/92RPE3BZ] (analyzing potential Trump Supreme Court picks on a liberal-conservative scale).
152
See, e.g., Ariane de Vogue, Travel Ban, Religious Liberty Cases Could Keep Swing Vote
Kennedy Around, CNN (June 26, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/26/politics/anthony-kennedysupreme-court-monday/index.html [https://perma.cc/JYL6-M349] (describing Justice Kennedy as a
“swing vote” on the Court).
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Douglas M. Parker, Justice Kennedy: The Swing Voter & His Critics, 11 GREEN BAG 2D 317,
318 (2008).
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The Rule of Four lets the competing factions have a say in this scenario.
For the liberal Justices who are usually in the minority, they can wait for
cases that will bring the swing Justice on board. The conservatives may feel
they can take more risks if the swing Justice is usually with them and take
cases that could move the law to the right, even if the pivotal Justice is not
particularly interested in that case or issue.
Moreover, there are areas of the law where the traditional left-right
distinction breaks down.154 If there are dimensions on which Justices who
are often in the minority can cobble together a majority by peeling off one
or two Justices from the usual majority coalition, that provides another
opportunity for the Rule of Four to make a difference and gives Justices who
normally find themselves in dissent a pathway to victory.
Importantly, the minority can do this without the initial support of the
defecting Justice. That Justice may not wish to take a case that will split the
usual majority for collegiality reasons; she may not think the area of law is
particularly important, etcetera. Still, the minority can use the Rule of Four
to push the case onto the docket and collect the defector’s vote at disposition
to secure the win.
3. Stuffing the Docket
It is well known that the Court takes fewer cases these days than it did
in earlier eras. The Court has decided no more than seventy-seven cases
during any term in the Roberts era, and it has decided less than eighty cases
in every year since 2000, when it issued eighty-one opinions.155 Under
Roberts, the Court decides on average just over seventy opinions a year.
While the Court could always take more cases—indeed, the Court took 111
cases in 1992 and over 150 cases through much of the 1970s and 1980s—in
practice it does not seem willing to go much beyond eighty cases a year.156
Given this empirical regularity, the Rule of Four creates an opportunity for
minority coalitions to crowd the docket. If there are only about seventy to
eighty slots available in a given term, every case placed on the docket by the
minority takes up a slot that otherwise might be filled by ideological
opponents in the majority. Several types of cases might be candidates for a
minority coalition interested in using this strategy to limit its overall losses.
First, it may want to take cases that the Court will decide unanimously.
By definition, the minority coalition would be a part of the “winning”
coalition in a unanimous decision. If the minority bloc can substitute a
154

The obvious example is formalism in criminal cases. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.
296, 297 (2004) (in which Justice Scalia, a conservative, wrote for a 5–4 majority joined by liberal
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg as well as conservative Justice Thomas).
155
SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu [https://perma.cc/7XXG-3JUU] (last visited
Feb. 11, 2018). The numbers include signed opinions, per curiam opinions, or judgments following oral
arguments.
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unanimous case for one it would lose narrowly, it will almost certainly be
better off on the ideology dimension. Second, the minority may be able to
take a case they care little about but is of particular interest to a possible
swing Justice. For instance, even if Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg
did not care deeply about whether judge-found facts were inappropriate to
use as the basis for a sentencing enhancement,157 if Justice Scalia did care
about advancing his formalist agenda in this area, these other three Justices
could join with him to grant cert and be on the winning side. This provides
an additional reason to pick cases where the minority coalition could pick
off a member of the usual majority. Even if this case is of little importance
to the minority coalition, taking this case may take up a slot that would
otherwise go to a case they would lose.
One may object that the argument as presented relies on the Court taking
only a fixed number of cases. As the Court could always take more cases,
this seems to be a questionable assumption. However, as an initial matter,
there is an empirical reality that the Court does not take more than eighty
cases a year. The finite docket may not be an actual constraint, but the Court
seems to treat it as though it were. But more importantly, this ability to stuff
the docket does not rely on the Court only taking a limited number of cases.
As the docket increases, the cost of deciding cases—for example, the
time reading briefs, hearing arguments, writing opinions, etcetera—
increases, and there is value in stuffing the docket. Put differently, if the 81st
case is costlier to decide than the 80th, and the 82nd is costlier than the 81st,
and so forth, then there are times the minority bloc would prefer to stuff the
docket. The reason is the traditional comparison of marginal costs and
benefits. If the 79th case is less costly than the 80th, then there is a set of
cases that are sufficiently important and would provide the majority with a
sufficiently large ideological payoff that they would want to take the case as
the 79th, but the importance and ideology are not large enough to pay the
higher cost if it were to be the 80th case. Accordingly, cases that are
somewhat important and give a small to medium ideological gain to the
majority bloc—and presumably a corresponding loss to the minority bloc—
might be passed over if the docket is already sufficiently large. Very
important cases or cases where the majority could achieve a significant
policy victory might still find their way onto the docket despite the
docket-stuffing strategy because the payoff is high enough to justify paying
the higher cost for taking another case on an already-crowded docket. But at
the margin, the minority bloc can block some losses by stuffing the docket
even if the Court is unconstrained in how many cases it takes.
Finally, and perhaps most surprisingly, it is possible that the minority
bloc would even be willing to lose cases they find unimportant to pursue this
157

See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301 (“This case requires us to apply the rule we expressed [in a previous
case]: ‘Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’”).
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blocking strategy. Suppose a Justice does not care much about tax law and
taking an additional case can keep some cases the Justice does care about,
and will lose, off of the docket. In that instance, it seems clear the Justice
would be happy to lose on the tax issue. Even if it is an area of the law the
Justice does care about, if the law is already bad from her perspective, then
taking another case in this area that will leave the law in the same or a
similarly bad place may be a small price to pay to keep a case off of the
docket where the majority coalition could actually move the law enough to
cause the minority Justice real pain.
This raises an interesting question: what prevents the minority bloc from
taking the first eighty meaningless cases that come along to keep the Court
majority from doing mischief? The answer is simply that if the minority was
so blatant, the majority could change the Rule of Four.158 The Court did
something similar regarding the practice of “holding” cases. The Court will
occasionally hold a case pending the outcome of a related case. It used to be
the Court would hold a case when three Justices requested it. Death penalty
opponents on the Court used this rule to hold death penalty appeals that the
Court would otherwise reject, thus delaying the execution. As a result, the
majority eventually changed the rule to require four votes to hold a case. 159
This suggests that if a minority coalition presses this advantage too far, it
could lose it entirely.
E. Majority Benefits
These possibilities generate real benefits for Justices in the minority, but
they raise the question of why a majority allows the Rule of Four to continue.
If the minority is regularly inconveniencing the majority, the majority should
simply eliminate the Rule of Four; the Rule is customary not statutory.160 So
scholars must account for the continuation of the rule as a part of the cert
process.

158

See Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 529 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (“The ‘rule of four’ is not a command of Congress. It is . . . fair enough [as a] rule of thumb
on the assumption that four Justices find such importance on an individualized screening of the cases
sought to be reviewed. The reason for deference to a minority view no longer holds when a class of
litigation is given a special and privileged position.”).
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See Mark Tushnet, “The King of France with Forty Thousand Men”: Felker v Turpin and the
Supreme Court’s Deliberative Processes, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 163, 181 (1996) (“[A] month before
Marshall himself retired, the justices voted to require four votes to hold cases. . . . For Marshall, however,
it was purchased at the cost of the decent consideration that people sentenced to death ought to receive
from the nation’s highest court.”).
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See, e.g., Ferguson, 352 U.S. at 529 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The ‘rule of four’ is not a
command of Congress. It is . . . fair enough [as a] rule of thumb on the assumption that four Justices find
such importance on an individualized screening of the cases sought to be reviewed. The reason for
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A few possibilities present themselves immediately. First, the Court may
worry that eliminating the Rule of Four would draw a Congressional
response. Congress may respond by mandating the Rule of Four, or worse
(from the Court’s perspective), reducing the discretion the Court has over its
own docket.161 Second, it may be that Justices recognize that their careers
are likely to be long, and there may come a day when they will be in the
minority. If a majority of Justices expect the Rule to be beneficial to them
over time, they may want to keep it as insurance.
Also, Justices may be concerned about overlooking important cases.
Justices have different preferences regarding areas of law and believe that
the Court should be more or less active in different areas. The Rehnquist
Court had a healthy contingent of Justices from the western United States162
and these Justices were attuned to cases involving water rights.163 The Rule
of Four made it easier for this western bloc to force the Court to take
important water cases the majority would have missed because other Justices
were less attuned to questions involving water rights. So, one way the Rule
of Four benefits the majority is by making it easier for a larger variety of
cases—reflecting different substantive interests of Justices—to make the
docket.
Jeff Lax provides a third and more intriguing justification.164 He argues
that the Rule is actually median enhancing.165 That is, the median Justice
agrees to the Rule of Four because it credibly binds her to take certain cases.
Suppose a lower court does not follow Supreme Court precedent exactly.166
Instead, it deviates slightly, but not enough so that the Court median wants
to take the time and spend the resources to correct the error. Though the
Court median does not want to take the case, if forced to take it, she will
enforce her preferred rule and overturn the lower court.
Now view this framework from the perspective of the lower court. If the
Court followed a majority rule at the cert stage, the lower court would be
free to deviate from the Court’s preference because the median does not
161

Possible Congressional actions related to the certiorari process are addressed in Part IV.B, infra.
Though born in Wisconsin, Rehnquist was educated in California and practiced law in Arizona
for 16 years. William H. Rehnquist, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/william_h_rehnquist
[https://perma.cc/796W-RWXM] (last visited Jan. 13, 2018). O’Connor was born in Texas, educated in
California, and was a state senator and judge in Arizona. Current Members, SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx [https://perma.cc/NZ2R-QTL4]
(last visited Jan. 13, 2018). Justice Kennedy was born and raised in California and served on the Ninth
Circuit before being elevated to the Court. Id.
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See, e.g., Docket Sheet at 1, Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989) (No. 88-309),
http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/blackmunMemos/1988/GM-1988-pdf/88-309.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
L8J9-UAZW] (concerning water rights).
164
See Lax, supra note 109, at 68 (“I show that this rule increases the power of the median Justice
by increasing lower court compliance with her/his preferred legal doctrine. Ironically, it strengthens the
median Justice by reducing her/his pivotal power.”).
165
Id.
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think it is worth the effort. But the median Justice is not pivotal under the
Rule of Four. The Justice just to the right of the median patrols deviations
by liberal circuits, and Justices to the left of the median are on the lookout
for conservative attempts to violate precedent. This dramatically reduces the
range in which lower courts can cheat if they are so inclined. If lower courts
deviate now, either the Justice to the left or to the right of the median will
blow the whistle, and the lower court will get overturned on appeal. This
keeps lower courts in line, as they recognize a higher probability that any
cheating will be caught and overturned.
If we think that the Court median is generally able to decide cases at her
ideal policy, what she really wants from the lower courts is that they follow
that policy. By turning over the agenda-setting power to the Justices on
either side of her, she is able to get compliance from the lower courts. By
handing over power at the agenda-setting stage, the median Justice gets to
keep lower courts in line. Under this logic, the median benefits tremendously
from the Rule of Four, and so she would not support its demise.
This account is elegant and has the virtue of being about the only
theoretical attempt to answer the intriguing question of why the Court
majority continues to follow the Rule of Four. Nonetheless, there are a
couple of empirical inconsistencies with the theory. First of all, the Justices
are generally clear that they do not view themselves as engaged in error
correction. If the lower court “deviates” because the Court has been unclear,
then the Justices will likely take the case to clarify the law, not to simply
correct an error. If the law is clear and the lower courts still cheat, then the
Court either ignores it, because the law is clear and the Court’s job is done,
or it may simply reverse summarily.
Another point to keep in mind is that in the early Rehnquist Court, Byron
White was both the Court median and the most frequent advocate for taking
more cases. For instance, in the several terms when Justice Kennedy was the
junior Justice, Justice White voted to grant cert 486 times.167 Chief Justice
Rehnquist came in second with 284 votes in favor of cert.168 One implication
of Lax’s model is that ceteris paribus the median should be less likely to
grant cert, but Justice White defies that prediction. Of course, all else is not
likely equal. Justice White thought the Court should be deciding more cases,
and he voted accordingly. But it appears Justice White did not need the Rule
of Four to help him monitor cases.
F. The Anti-Filibuster
The preceding Section suggests that the Rule of Four gets the Court
involved in cases of great importance even when the majority does not want
to end up there. There is an interesting comparison here with the filibuster
167
168
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rule in the Senate. The supermajority requirement in the Senate empowers
the minority to keep certain proposals from coming up for consideration. It
also has the effect of empowering the Senate as an institution. Without the
filibuster, the Senate would likely devolve into a purely majoritarian
institution like the House. Policy negotiations would only need to satisfy the
median to clear a majority. But with the filibuster in place, much if not most
of the important legislative work hinges on getting through the Senate
filibuster. This moderates policy, but it also enhances the Senate’s standing.
Just as the Senate filibuster raises that chamber’s profile, the Rule of
Four promotes the Court. By keeping the Court engaged in a broader range
of cases and by increasing the odds that the Court will find itself deciding
matters of great public concern, the Rule keeps the Court at the front and
center of public life. Of course, once in the game, the Justices have to play,
and that is where questions about the relationship between ideological and
jurisprudential preferences come to the fore.
III. AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF POLITICS IN THE CERTIORARI
PROCESS
Certiorari is the narrow gateway to review, so naturally practitioners and
academics have long been interested in what it takes to get the Court to take
a case.169 Scholars have also been attuned to the substantive importance of
certiorari as an institution.170 The ability to control the docket gives the Court
the power to direct its “mere[] judgment” if it does not fully provide Force
or Will.171 By choosing what issues it will place on its docket, it directly
affects the political agenda for the nation.172 Equally important, by choosing
169

E.g., Caldeira & Wright, supra note 110, at 1109; Robert M. Lawless & Dylan Lager Murray,
An Empirical Analysis of Bankruptcy Certiorari, 62 MO. L. REV. 101, 102–04 (1997); PERRY, supra note
15, at 135–39; David C. Thompson and Melanie F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court
Certiorari Petition Procedures: The Call for Response and the Call for the Views of the Solicitor
General, 16 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 237, 239 (2009).
170
E.g., Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William
Howard Taft, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1363, 1366 (2006) (suggesting that “the reduced merits docket has
exacerbated the shortcomings within the Rehnquist Court’s grant process of certiorari review, and has
had a negative impact on its jurisprudence” and that “the ‘cert. pool’—the first level of review for any
petition for certiorari—has become too powerful”); Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray,
The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection,
82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 397 (2004) (“Given the many levels on which the Court’s case-selection
decisions impact its work, its role, and its image, decisionmaking at the threshold stage may be second
to none in importance.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 227 (Alexander Hamilton). But see Hartnett, supra note 5, at 1718
(arguing that while Hamilton’s assertion is still widely quoted, it is “hardly an accurate description of a
court that has the power to set its own agenda. . . . The ability to set one’s own agenda is at the heart of
exercising will”).
172
See Warren E. Burger & Earl Warren, Retired Chief Justice Warren Attacks, Chief Justice
Burger Defends Freund Study Group’s Composition and Proposal, 59 A.B.A. J. 721, 728 (1973) (noting
that denials of certiorari can have a large impact on legal developments); see also Margaret Meriwether
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which questions to avoid, the Court can sidestep landmines that might
threaten its standing.173
Unfortunately, it is quite difficult to study certiorari using traditional
tools of legal scholarship. The Court gives scholars little to work with when
it comes to the cert process, and since the writ is discretionary, there is no
legal right to cert to be understood, much less vindicated.174 The standard
legal tools of careful explication of reasoned and public opinions are almost
entirely unavailable to us because the Court does not explain its cert
decisions. What guidance they do provide is largely provided in Rule 10,
which offers a list of considerations that is “neither controlling nor fully
measur[es] the Court’s discretion.”175 The remaining information we have
from traditional legal sources comes largely from occasional dissents from
denials of cert.176
Answers to substantive questions must therefore come from sources
other than the U.S. Reports or Statutes at Large. Qualitatively, the Justices
have occasionally spoken individually about the cert process.177 H.W. Perry
has a justifiably famous book based on interviews with Justices and clerks
about the cert process.178 Quantitatively inclined scholars have undertaken
large-scale data collection efforts to piece together the information available
to the Justices at the cert stage, looking for clues as to what drives the
decision.179
The aim of this Section is to study the cert process quantitatively to
understand the Court more broadly. Cert is not so much the subject of
inquiry as it is the lens through which one may examine the Court. Put
differently, by viewing the cert process as a political process embedded in a
judicial institution, we can learn a lot about the Court.
This study requires a model of voting at the cert stage that assumes
Justices participate in the agenda-setting round with a good understanding
Cordray & Richard Cordray, Setting the Social Agenda: Deciding to Review High-Profile Cases at the
Supreme Court, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 313, 313 (2009) (arguing that the cases that the Supreme Court
grants cert on have the ability to influence the public’s view on important issues).
173
KLOPPENBERG, supra note 21; Marshall, supra note 12; Hartnett, supra note 5, at 1648 (“[T]he
legitimacy of judicial action is widely thought to be dependent on its conformity with law, yet there is
(virtually) no law governing the Supreme Court’s exercise of power to set its own agenda, and the Court
has steadfastly refused to establish any.”); Tom R. Tyler & Kenneth Rasinski, Procedural Justice,
Institutional Legitimacy, and the Acceptance of Unpopular U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: A Reply to
Gibson, 25 L. & SOC’Y REV. 621, 622 (1991).
174
See Hartnett, supra note 5, at 1648 (nothing that the Supreme Court has discretion to grant
certiorari).
175
SUP. CT. R. 10.
176
E.g., Singleton v. Comm’r, 439 U.S. 940, 940–42 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari); id. at 942 (Stevens, J., responding to Blackmun).
177
See id. at 942–51 (providing Justice Stevens’s interpretation on granting of certiorari).
178
PERRY, supra note 15.
179
See, e.g., Caldeira & Wright, supra note 110, at 1109–10 (discussing an “empirical” study “on
the impact of amicus curiae participation” on the Court’s decisions “to grant writs of certiorari”).
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of both the current law and the likely consequences of taking the case. Thus,
the model assumes Justices are strategic in the sense that they are able to
look down the game tree and make educated guesses as to how the case will
turn out.180 In comparison, the model allows Justices to be ideological; that
is, they may act on ideological preferences. This Section uses the model to
address three important questions about the Court. First, it quantifies how
much of what the Justices do—at least at the cert stage—is about ideology
and how much is about the commonly recognized Rule 10 factors. Second,
it provides evidence that stable ideological minorities are able to wield
disproportionate influence at the cert stage. Finally, it suggests a previously
overlooked power of the Chief Justice at the agenda-setting stage. But first,
to motivate this empirical exploration, the Section begins with a brief
description of the research model.
A. A Brief Description of the Model and Estimation Strategy
Studying the cert votes allows a greater understanding of the Court. This
Section presents two novel findings that result from a relatively simple
model. The model used is closely related to the models used to understand
Justices’ votes at disposition. Perhaps the most well known of these models
is that of Professors Martin and Quinn,181 which is widely used in the law
and social-science literatures.182 They look at how Justices vote when
deciding to reverse or affirm a decision on the merits and use that
information to derive “ideal points” for each Justice.
As certiorari is a different process, the standard model must be adapted
to take the contours of the cert process seriously.183 The model presented
here accounts for Join-3 votes, different Justices’ preferences regarding
taking cases, and different Justices’ comfort with using the Join-3 as a tool.
180
See, e.g., Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, Strategy in Supreme Court Case
Selection: The Relationship Between Certiorari and the Merits, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 29 (2008) (“[T]here
is a significant merits-oriented component in the Justices’ decisionmaking on certiorari.”).
181
Martin & Quinn, supra note 25, at 135.
182
E.g., Andrew D. Martin et al., The Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court, 83 N.C.
L. REV. 1275, 1279 (2005); Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of
Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319, 1353–54 (2009); Matthew
Sag, Tonja Jacobi & Maxim Sytch, Ideology and Exceptionalism in Intellectual Property: An Empirical
Study, 97 CAL. L. REV. 801, 820–21 (2009); Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a
Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1746 (2010).
183
From a technical perspective, my model makes only minor adjustments to standard models in
the literature. While these models appear at first glance to be so-much statistical wizardry, they are
well-known in the literature and quite valuable to scholars. See, e.g., Joshua B. Fischman, Do the Justices
Vote Like Policy Makers? Evidence from Scaling the Supreme Court with Interest Groups, 44 J. LEGAL
STUD. S269, S274 (2015); Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 69, 104 (2010); see also Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, How Not to Lie with Judicial Votes:
Misconceptions, Measurement, and Models, 98 CAL. L. REV. 813, 833–34 (2010) (noting that by using
data on merits votes, Professors Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn, and Lee Epstein were able to
calculate the probability that each Justice was the median member of the Court).
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It also accounts for the Court’s stated preference for bringing clarity to the
law. Cases where the Court can bring clarity to the law will reduce the
variance in lower court outcomes, and Justices derive utility from reducing
this variance.
There are several benefits to using cert votes as opposed to the Justices’
decisions on the merits. First, there are many more votes at the
agenda-setting stage than at the merits stage. There are usually two to three
times as many cases with recorded cert votes as there are cases decided on
the merits. Second, because the Justices choose which cases they take but do
not get to choose which petitions are filed, there is less concern that results
are biased by their selectivity. These advantages lead to ideal point estimates
that are far more stable than those recovered from merits votes. The model
also returns other interesting quantities including measures of Justices’
individual preferences for taking lots of cases, the expected ideological shift
in the law from taking the case, and even a rough measure of case
importance. The model may also easily be adapted to take into account
different covariates of interest, for example, whether the petition is a civil
case, comes from a federal court, is a capital case, etcetera.
The model is more fully presented in the accompanying technical
appendix. But, in brief, the assumption is that Justices and policies can be
placed in a single left-right dimension. A liberal policy is to the left of a
conservative policy, and a liberal, like Justice Brennan, is to the left of a
conservative, like Chief Justice Rehnquist.184 Justices have an idea of where
the current law is on this line, and they have an idea of where the law will
end up if the Court takes the case.185 The ideological calculation the Justices
make depends in part on whether the new policy would be closer to them
than the old one.186
The model assumes that Justices would like to vote to grant cert for
important cases, cases that clarify the law, and cases that move the law in
their preferred ideological direction.187 Cases that are not important, will not
do much to improve doctrinal clarity, or will move the law away from a
Justice’s preferred rule should not receive a vote for cert. In addition, as
Justices implicitly compare the reasons for and against voting to grant cert,
184
Ho and Quinn argue that while this spatial framework is helpful to motivate the model, it is not
strictly necessary to justify the statistical enterprise. See Ho & Quinn, supra note 186, at 819 (noting that
“measurement models can be illuminating even if the spatial theory is questionable”).
185
See infra Technical Appendix. Strictly speaking, all that is required is that Justices share a
common belief about the distribution of the rules that lower courts currently apply and the distribution
lower courts will apply if the Court takes the case. By framing the model in terms of the distribution of
possible policies instead of the single policy, it is possible to treat the variance of the likely applications
as a measure of the law’s clarity. When there is a circuit split and the law is unclear, there is a high
variance in the current application. If the Court could decide the case in such a way that this variance
would be reduced, this would create a reason for every Justice to take the case.
186
Id.
187
See PERRY, supra note 15, at 217, 253–54.
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Justices must also consider how many cases they would like to take overall,
with some Justices preferring to take more cases than others.188 Accordingly,
different Justices will need the positive factors to outweigh the reasons to
deny cert by more than other Justices. Once the benefits reach that
Justice-specific critical level, the Justice will at least vote Join-3. If the
reasons to grant are strong enough, that Join-3 will turn into a full vote to
grant.189 In this way, the model follows Perry’s guidance that the Join-3 is a
timid grant.190
This model has three types of variables. The first type of variables are
case-specific, including information drawn from the memos, a term to
capture191 general case importance,192 and the (possibly negative) distance
between where the law is and where they expect it to be if they grant cert.193
If the distance is positive, then the law is expected to move to the right
(become more conservative than the current doctrine).194 Likewise, if the
distance is negative, this signals the law is expected to move to the left. If
the distance is close to zero, then the Court does not expect doctrine to
become much more conservative or liberal, as it will not move far at all.
The second type of variables are Justice specific. The first of these is
each Justice’s ideal point. This is directly analogous to ideal points measured
by Martin and Quinn.195 These ideal points are often viewed as a measure of
the conservatism or liberalism of a Justice’s jurisprudence or ideology.196
Second, a Justice-specific parameter sets the individual Justice’s floor for
188

Kenneth W. Moffett, Forrest Maltzman, Karen Miranda & Charles R. Shipan, Strategic Behavior
and Variation in the Supreme Court’s Caseload over Time, 37 JUST. SYS. J. 20, 20 (2016).
189
See PERRY, supra note 15, at 168.
190
Id. at 167–68.
191
The case importance term measures the commonly recognized level of importance. Rather than
assuming that all circuit splits, for example, create a fixed level of importance, the model has the
flexibility to recover the common level of importance recognized by all Justices for a given case. Justices
can think some splits are more important than others, that some recommendations from the SG are more
urgent, etc. The case importance term backs out the level of importance common to all Justices regardless
of the factors.
192
It is important to distinguish between a case that is important ex-ante and a case that becomes
important ex-post. Take the earlier Free Exercise example of Smith. See discussion supra Part I. When it
appeared, the case was not intrinsically important. It subsequently became a very important precedent
because of the law the Court made. At cert, case importance is about the ex-ante importance, which is
independent of the legacy the case may create.
193
See infra Technical Appendix. This is actually the expected value of a draw from the distribution
of policies that will follow either denying or granting cert. The variance of these distributions captures
the clarity or lack thereof in the law and is captured in the case importance term.
194
Ho & Quinn, supra note 186, at 827.
195
Martin & Quinn, supra note 184, at 135.
196
Ho & Quinn, supra note 186, at 836–37. Ho and Quinn appropriately point out that the best
understanding of this parameter is “a descriptive summary of the single dimension that best characterizes
differences in” the Justices’ votes. Id. The measures correspond to the familiar left-right spectrum, but
this does not necessarily imply that “the scale accords with a coherent political philosophy or pure policy
preferences untethered from law.” Id.
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197

voting Join-3. If a Justice requires a greater “payoff” to take a case, then
she will vote to take fewer cases than other Justices, holding all else equal.
The final Justice-specific parameter is the threshold at which the Justice
moves from Join-3 to a full grant.
The last terms are specific to individual Justices in a specific case.198
The first of these is a random shock. I assume that these shocks are normally
distributed with a mean of zero, so that in expectation, the shock should not
change any Justice’s vote in any case. The second such term is each Justice’s
net return from taking the case. This net return is calculated by combining
the Justice-specific terms with the case-specific terms and adding the
random shock.199 If this return is higher than the Justice’s grant threshold
(the third Justice-specific term), she votes to grant. If this return is between
the two threshold values for the Justice, she casts a Join-3. If it is less than
the Join-3 threshold (the second Justice-specific value), she votes to deny.
The estimation procedure is relatively straightforward. It starts by
randomly filling in values for each of the case- and Justice-specific
parameters.200 The next step is to look at the actual vote and use that
information to draw the error term. Since there is a Justice-specific constant,
the assumption is that a Justice would vote to deny cert if her net return is
less than zero. The computer draws a random error term subject to the
constraint that, when included with the Justice- and case-specific terms,
results in negative net utility. It then uses the new error term and the
case-specific parameters to estimate new values for the Justice-specific
parameters. Having done that, it uses the net utility and just-found
Justice-specific terms to estimate case-specific terms. The program moves
in a loop, holding the two terms constant and using them to find the third.
The loop cycles thousands of times and stores these values. At the end of the
run, the average values are computed, and those are the numbers given in
the following analysis.
B. The Effect of Ideology on the Docket
While political scientists generally use such models to measure
ideology, a substantively more important question is whether that ideology
affects the Court’s docket. Fortunately, the cert model provides tools to
begin answering this question. The gap parameter provides an estimate for
the expected change in policy along an ideological dimension.201 Using these
197

See infra Technical Appendix.
Id. at Model 1.
199
Id. at 65.
200
Id. at 59.
201
One of the things to keep in mind about these models is that the distances are not well identified.
But they do give a relative notion of distance, and the direction is identified once Rehnquist is fixed on
the right and Brennan on the left. What this means is that if the estimated model returns a +2 for one case
198
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estimates, it is straightforward to compare the cases in which the Court
granted cert with those in which it denied the writ. If the docket is not
influenced by ideology, then the gap parameters—which measure the
expected change in the law if the Court grants cert—should look similar.
Thinking in terms of probability distributions, we would anticipate that the
ideological distribution of granted cases should match the ideological
distribution of denied cases. And yet when those two distributions are
compared in Figure 1, they do not match.202
Figure 1 shows the empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
the gap parameters for the subset of cases where the Court granted cert and
the subset where the Court denied certiorari. The plus-signs represent
expected shifts of cases the Court granted. Notice that for cases further to
the left, for example, those less than -0.5 or so, the plus-signs are well to the
right of the simple dots, which represent the cases the clerks recommended
granting. That indicates that the Court took relatively few cases expected to
move the law to the left. In the middle of the graph—near zero—the
plus-signs catch up quickly. That indicates that the Court took a lot of cases
where importance, not ideology, was the most important factor. Finally,
looking further to the right of the figure, the plus-signs are again to the right
of the dots. That signals that the conservatives were able to take relatively
more ideologically conservative cases. In sum, the conservatives on the
Court were generally effective at putting cases on the docket that would
maximize a conservative shift in the law.

and a -1 for another, we can say that the first case is expected to move the law in a conservative direction
and that change should be larger than the expected liberal change in the law for the second case.
202
See infra Figure 3. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test returns a p-value of 0.0025. Thus, we can
confidently reject the hypothesis that the distributions are the same.
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Figure 1: Set of Granted Cases Are Ideologically Different than Denied
Cases

But the story is a bit more complex than this. The comparison between
the granted and denied cases clearly demonstrates that the cases that make
the docket are expected to end up with more conservative outcomes than the
ones that do not make it through certiorari. But another interesting
comparison is between the cases that make the docket and the cases that
“should” make the docket based only on importance. This is a tougher test
to run because it requires generating a set of cases that the Court “should”
take. Fortunately, the cert pool memos are available to serve as a worthy
proxy.
Recall that the clerks who write the memos are instructed to provide a
recommendation as to whether the Court should grant the petition. Further,
the memo and recommendation are supposed to be free of clerks’ own
ideological biases. Of course, this is not to say that clerks never fudge on the
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recommendation to promote or protect ideological considerations. It is only
to say that the institutional pressures are against such behavior. Further, there
is no reason to think that conservative or liberal clerks are any more or less
likely to shade the truth. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to use the set of
cases where clerks recommended granting cert as a proxy for the distribution
of cases important enough to grant cert.
Figure 2 below shows the ideological distribution of the cases where the
clerks recommended a grant in gray and the ideological distribution of cases
the Court actually granted in black.203 The bars represent the proportion of
total recommendations and actual grants that would move the law
significantly to the left, the right, or not much at all.204 If the clerks’
recommendations are representative of the breakdown of the “important”
cases, it appears that the liberal bloc is getting more cases onto the docket
than it “should.”
Figure 2: Liberal Minority Gets Extra Cases

203

The data is drawn from the 1988 term.
Gap parameters less than -1 are considered liberal moves, parameters greater than 1 are
conservative moves, and parameters that suggest policy would move less than one unit in either direction
were classified as no/small shift.
204
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These two different comparisons lead to the following conclusions about
the effect of ideology on the cert process. First, conservatives know that they
are likely to win on the merits, and they prefer to take and win important
cases. Doing so means trying to keep less important cases or those where
there will not be a sufficiently large conservative shift in the law off of the
docket. Second, they are usually successful at this, but in a nontrivial number
of cases, the liberal minority is able to identify cases they—but not the
conservative majority—want to put on the docket. They do not get as many
of these cases as they would like, but they get more than they “should”
compared to the clerk recommendations. In short, conservatives are able to
use certiorari to identify important cases that will let them move the law to
the right, but liberals are able to use the Rule of Four to add additional cases
of their choosing.
These empirical observations align with some of the strategies suggested
above. Liberal coalitions on the conservative Rehnquist Court were able to
use the Rule of Four to push additional cases onto the docket, consistent with
the various minority-enhancing strategies above. Similarly, the evidence
suggests that the set of cases the Court actually grants are likely to yield
more conservative outcomes than the cases it rejects. This suggests the
conservative majority targeted cases to promote their policy preferences.
C. The Chief Justice Really Matters
Another aspect available through the cert votes is a chance to examine
the importance of the Chief Justice. The Chief has several tools that
empower him to shape the law. The foremost is the power to assign
opinions.205 But the Chief has two particular opportunities to affect the
development of law through the case selection process. The first tool is the
Discuss List. The Chief is responsible for circulating the first draft of the
list, and so he is able to ensure that his preferred cases are considered. 206
However, this particular first-mover advantage is not all that strong on its
own as any Justice can add a case to the Discuss List.207 The Chief cannot
prevent a case from being discussed, and he has no more power than any
other Justice to add a case.
The second possible advantage the Chief has is another first-mover
advantage: the privilege of voting first.208 Since Justices have little time to
analyze each petition,209 they may not have very fixed opinions on the
205

Jeffrey R. Lax & Charles M. Cameron, Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the US Supreme
Court, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 276, 276 (2007).
206
PERRY, supra note 15, at 85.
207
Id.
208
Id. at 86.
209
See Hart, supra note 98, at 88 (discussing the limited time that a Justice has to analyze petitions);
McElwain, supra note 98, at 14 (same).
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210

importance of a case. In such a situation, the institutional practice of
voting sequentially instead of simultaneously presents an opportunity for
Justices to learn about the case based on the votes of others. Justices vote in
order of seniority, so in the data, Chief Justice Rehnquist usually voted
first.211 As such, other Justices could take cues from his vote. Of course, if a
Justice did not share the Chief’s views on what made a case certworthy, or
believed the Chief’s vote was a poor signal of quality in general, she may
have thought the signal was uninformative and ignored it.
The challenge in looking for the first-mover advantage is distinguishing
between signaling and shared ideology. If conservatives would like to have
taken a case, then Rehnquist should have voted to take the case, as should
the other conservatives. Their votes should have been correlated simply
because they shared a common ideology.
One can separate out the effect of ideology by controlling for it through
treating Rehnquist’s votes as data. Begin by coding a Rehnquist vote in favor
of cert (including a Join-3) as 1 and a vote to deny a petition as -1. Then,
include that variable as data in the cert model and estimate as before. The
estimation procedure will return a different coefficient for each Justice,
which measures the effect of the Chief’s vote. This measures the effect
associated with Rehnquist’s vote while still controlling for ideology. 212 To
capture the effect of the Chief’s vote, I first count how many votes the full
model—including the Chief’s vote—correctly predicts. I then subtract the
effect of the Chief’s vote from the underlying net utility and predict the votes
again. The difference in the number of correct predictions is the predicted
effect of the Chief’s vote.213
The data show the correlation from Rehnquist’s vote affects roughly 7
percent of other Justices’ cert votes. As Figure 5 shows, the effect is positive
and significant for five of the eight Justices. For Justices O’Connor and
Kennedy, the effect is quite substantial; the effect associated with
Rehnquist’s votes was large enough to change 16 percent of their votes.
210

But see PERRY, supra note 15, at 86 (explaining that Justices may put a case on the discussion
list without having a strong opinion about it).
211
The exceptions are in cases added to the list by another Justice, in which that Justice would lead
off the discussion. Id.
212
I coded votes to grant and Join-3 as 1, votes to decline as 0, and dropped all cases where
Rehnquist did not vote. It is important to note that the causal effect is not strictly identified here, as I
cannot randomize the Chief Justice. Still, the correlation is consistent with a model of other Justices
learning from the Chief’s vote.
213
This is a conservative measure of the effect. The test is based on the counterfactual scenario
where the Chief does not vote, rather than where the Chief voted in the opposite direction. For instance,
suppose for a given Justice that the coefficient on the Chief Justice’s vote was 2. Then, if Rehnquist voted
to grant cert, that other Justice would add 2 to the underlying net utility, and would be more likely to vote
for cert. If he does not observe the Chief’s vote, then the additional two units go away. But if Rehnquist
had voted to deny, instead of adding 2 to the underlying measure of utility, one would subtract 2. This
would be a swing of four units, not two. If one were to run the test switching Rehnquist’s votes from
grant to deny and from deny to grant, then the effects would be even larger.
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Rehnquist’s vote pushed O’Connor and Kennedy to change their votes for
about forty-five petitions in 1989 alone.
Justice Blackmun was also more likely to vote for cert if Rehnquist did.
While Blackmun was not as far to the left as Justices Brennan or Marshall,
he was hardly a regular member of the conservative majority on the Court.214
Blackmun’s greater likelihood to follow the Chief at cert indicates that
Rehnquist’s vote is signaling something to Blackmun about the
certworthiness of the case.

214

See Christopher E. Smith & Thomas R. Hensley, Assessing the Conservatism of the Rehnquist
Court, 77 JUDICATURE 83, 86, 88 (1993) (describing Blackmun’s transformation from a “consistently
conservative” Justice into “one of the most liberal Justices on the Rehnquist court”).
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Figure 3:Effects of Rehnquist’s Vote on Five of the Other Eight Justices

It is important to note that since Rehnquist’s votes were not random,
these estimates are not strictly causal. While the sequence of votes makes it
impossible for O’Connor’s vote to have influenced Rehnquist’s vote, it is
still possible that some unmodeled and nonideological third factor explains
the correlation between these votes. Still, given the large literature on
sequential voting and first-mover effects,215 the results are consistent with
theories that would suggest the Chief has a strong influence on the docket
by moving first. This is strong—but still only suggestive—evidence that the
Chief has significant influence over the Court’s docket. This effect deserves
further study, especially because the Chief also votes first at disposition.216
If the first-mover advantage remains when the Court decides the case, or
215
See, e.g., Marco Ottaviani & Peter Sørensen, Information Aggregation in Debate: Who Should
Speak First?, 81 J. PUB. ECON. 393, 395–96 (2001) (examining the importance of the sequence in which
heterogeneous experts convey information); Jan Potters, Martin Sefton & Lise Vesterlund, After You—
Endogenous Sequencing in Voluntary Contribution Games, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 1399, 1400 (2005)
(studying the effects of the sequence of contributions and level of information on donors’ contributions
to a public good).
216
Timothy R. Johnson, James F. Spriggs II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Passing and Strategic Voting on
the U.S. Supreme Court, 39 L. & SOC’Y REV. 349, 350 (2005).
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when the assigned Justice circulates the draft opinion, then sequencing
effects would have a powerful effect on law.
For the purposes of this Article, it is enough to show that there is a high
likelihood that the Chief influences the docket. As we have seen previously,
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s own votes were highly affected by ideology.217 If
the Chief’s first-mover advantage is real, then Rehnquist’s ideology has an
outsized influence on the Court, which may help explain why the Court took
cases that pushed the law in Rehnquist’s preferred direction. Giving this sort
of power to the Chief seems normatively problematic, so the Article
proposes a change to the voting procedures that would reduce this monopoly
power.218
These results challenge the qualitative conclusions provided by Perry.219
To be sure, Perry’s initial thought was that the sequence would affect votes,
but he was repeatedly assured that it did not.220 There are several possible
explanations for the discrepancy between Perry’s initial hypothesis and the
results presented here on the one hand and the accounts provided by the
Justices to Perry on the other. First, as Perry recounts, there was not a great
deal of respect for Chief Justice Burger on the Court.221 It is possible that
Chief Justice Burger did not influence the votes of other Justices and those
Justices were correct in their self-assessments. The results presented here
come from the Rehnquist Court, and Rehnquist may have commanded
greater respect and wielded greater influence than Burger. Second, the
largest effects are concentrated among the newest Justices.222 It may be that
the effect dissipates over time. If so, the Chief may occasionally be able to
influence the votes of other Justices, but the effect is small enough that the
other Justices do not recount it in interviews.
IV. POLITICS IN CERTIORARI: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
So far, this Article has established the empirical reality of politics at play
in the cert process and worked through the possible strategies available to
the Justices under the Rule of Four. Essentially, it is now empirically clear
that the Justices are playing at politics and theoretically clear how they play.
At which point, there are two distinct questions remaining. First, what are
the potential consequences of politicizing the Court’s discretionary
jurisdiction and second, what if anything could be done about it?
217

See supra Figure 2.
See infra Part IV.B.3 (suggesting elimination of the tradition of voting in order of seniority).
219
See PERRY, supra note 15, at 86–87 (“[T]he ability to formulate and lead the discussion would
make little difference on cert. . . . Except in relatively rare instances, the Justices do not rely on one
another’s judgment at the cert. stage.”).
220
Id. at 87, 91.
221
Id. at 86.
222
See supra p. 621.
218
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A. Threats to the Court’s Legitimacy
As the Court becomes perceived as a policy-making body with political
preferences,223 its legitimacy is increasingly called into question.224 Work in
political psychology shows that citizens have a strong negative response to
Court decisions portrayed as politically motivated, compared to decisions
described as following legal guidelines.225 Similarly, respondents had a
lower view of the Court’s legitimacy when exposed to articles describing
Chief Justice Roberts’ decision in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius226 as a political decision to strategically flip his vote.227
As shown above, the Court’s certiorari decisions have led to a situation
where the merits docket is far more ideologically fraught than the certiorari
docket. By focusing its attention on these more polarizing cases, the Court
feeds the perception that its decisions are almost entirely ideological. If the
Court were deciding 350 cases a term that were more representative of the
certiorari docket, it is likely their decisions would appear far less ideological.
Instead, the Court has reduced its workload and concentrated on the most
divisive cases. This both undermines public support in the Court and means
that the Justices are leaving large fields of doctrine largely untended.
Threats to legitimacy exist outside of politics as well. At the conceptual
level, the politicization of the cert process further erodes the foundations of
judicial review. Consider Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury.
Marshall asserted that the Court had the power of judicial review because
“[t]hose who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound
and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must
decide on the operation of each.”228 Judicial review hinges on the Court’s
obligation—“of necessity” and “must decide”—to decide the question.229
Marshall was even more clear in Cohens v. Virginia:
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it
should not: but it is equally true, that it must take
jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the
legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the
confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by because it
223

See, e.g., Carrington & Cramton, infra note 277, at 590 (citing Posner, supra note 1, at 35–39,

60).
224
See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 8, at 4–5 (arguing that the Court sided with the government
and did not protect the plaintiff); SEGALL, supra note 8, at xvi–xvii (summarizing three major problems
with the Supreme Court).
225
Vanessa A. Baird & Amy Gangl, Shattering the Myth of Legality: The Impact of the Media’s
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is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever
difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it
be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that
which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to
the constitution. Questions may occur which we would
gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is,
to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to
perform our duty.230
On this traditional account, the Court’s power of judicial review is
incidental to its power to decide cases.231 Put differently, the Court’s
substantive power flows from its procedural obligations to decide cases. And
yet, the Court today has no such obligation. As Professor Hartnett has noted:
“A court that can simply refuse to hear a case can no longer credibly say that
it had to decide it.”232
When the Court gained control over its docket, it promised to avoid this
problem by taking cases “according to recognized principles.”233 For
instance, it promised Congress that it would take any case involving a circuit
split “as a matter of course,”234 as well as any “constitutional question of any
real merit or doubt.”235 The Court also promised that the lower courts could
certify questions to the Supreme Court, thereby “plac[ing] the question of
review also in the discretion of the Circuit Court of Appeals.”236 In essence,
Congress initially gave the Court discretion on the promise that the Court
would follow “recognized principles” that would involve the Court in
essentially every nonfrivolous case.237
While it soon became clear the Court was applying a stricter standard of
importance than mere nonfrivolousness, commenters remained convinced
that the Court avoided danger by having “defined standards for the exercise
230
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238

of its discretion.” Herbert Wechsler urged that “[o]nly the maintenance
and the improvement of such standards and, of course, their faithful
application can . . . protect the Court against the danger of the imputation of
bias . . . .”239
Neutral principles seemed to offer a way to hold off the challenge to the
Court’s judicial review power. By adhering to these objective standards, the
Court would be obligated to decide cases that meet objective criteria. With
obligation still in play, the judicial review power is maintained. Even so, it
is a bit unsettling that these criteria were established by the Court.
Accordingly, Wechsler urged Congress to play a more active role and to be
more specific about what types of cases the Court should take.240 This would
further remove politics and discretion from the Court and safeguard judicial
review within the confines of obligation.
Instead, Congress has moved in the other direction, removing almost all
mandatory jurisdiction and leaving the docket almost entirely to the
discretion of the Court even as the Court has refused to clarify its own
standards. The result is “a plenary docket reflecting the particular agenda of
shifting coalitions of four or more justices”241 instead of a docket composed
of cases that meet objective criteria.
The absence of such criteria leaves the Court unprotected “against the
danger of the imputation of bias.”242 What is more, as seen in Part II, bias is
clearly present. What is more disturbing is that the particular bias Wechsler
was concerned about when discussing the Court’s agenda setting was bias
for or against certain kinds of claims. He cites a law review note that showed
the Court was taking an unjustifiable number of claims under FELA. 243 The
present Article shows that the Court is directly biased for or against different
ideological outcomes. At cert, politics operates at a much more ideological
level than Wechsler imagined.
In sum, the lack of clear standards for managing the discretionary docket
opens up the Court to attack. In the absence of standards, the Justices often
pursue ideological aims through the cert process. This is particularly
problematic because it leads the Court to take cases it should not and to not
take cases it should, which violates the constitutional covenant that
empowers the Court to state what the law is. This problem is exacerbated
because the Court now focuses on the questions that let Justices implement
their political views. As such, it is not clear that the current Court is making
238
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legitimate use of the judicial power, and it is substituting Will, if not exactly
Force, for Judgment.244
B. Proposals to Channel or Relocate Political Power in Certiorari
Supposing ideological decision making and large agenda-setting power
by the Chief are problematic, what can be done about these features of the
current process? At the outset, it must be admitted any change is unlikely.
The current process represents the decades-long and successful attempt by
the Court to control and reduce its docket. It is unlikely to sit passively in
the face of attempts to temper this control. To the extent Congress has shown
interest in making use of its Article III powers, it usually works in the
direction of removing cases from the Court’s jurisdiction rather than
imposing pressure to increase transparency and neutrality in the cert
process.245 Insofar as the Justices have no incentive to change things and
Congress has no interest in forcing the issue, the success of any particular
proposal is doubtful. Still, reforms could take one of two paths. First, the
Court or Congress could pursue strategies to reform the substance of
certiorari rules. In the alternative, they could reform the process through
which the Court takes cases.
1. Clarify the Rules
A common refrain in the effort to improve certiorari is the request for
greater clarity. Scholars have again and again called on Congress or the
Court to promulgate improved standards that would provide clear guidance
for applicants. Such clarification should provide several benefits. First, by
being more explicit about the standards, the Court should face fewer
frivolous petitions, as parties in some cases would be able to read the rules
and realize the Court will not take their respective cases. Second, by
following clearer statements, the certiorari process would appear a more
legitimate use of judicial discretion. Clear rules would seem to make
certiorari both more efficient and more legitimate.
To succeed, the standards must be sufficiently clear and the Court
committed enough to them that the new regime would significantly reduce
the Court’s discretion over the docket. If the Court is still willing and able
to go beyond the standards, parties will still take their chances with a cert
petition—lowering the efficiency gains—and the Court would still be
perceived as exercising unbounded—instead of judicial—discretion,
limiting any legitimating upside.
244
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The challenge is to create and maintain such standards. To see the
difficulty in writing down such standards, consider the proposal by Samuel
Estreicher and John E. Sexton. They would divide cases into those the Court
should take (the Priority Docket), those the Court could take if it wanted (the
Discretionary Docket), and those the Court should not take (Improvident
Grants).246 The first of these categories would include cases where there are
“intolerable” splits in lower courts, blatant conflicts with Supreme Court
precedent, profound threats to federalism or the separation of powers,
interstate disputes, and those where either state courts strike a federal action
as unconstitutional or where the federal court strikes a state action. The
second set covers those cases where there is: reason to be suspicious of the
lower court when reviewing a federal question, a pressing case involving
vertical federalism disputes, interference with Executive authority, need for
the Court’s extraordinary powers of supervision, a national emergency, an
opportunity to advance the development of federal law, an appeal from a
court of exclusive jurisdiction, or a need to apply clear precedent in cases
where the effects could cause dramatic effects or “dislocation[s].”247 Even
with these standards, there is clearly much room left for discretion. Whether
a split is truly “intolerable,” for example, will always be a judgment call.
Similarly, whether a federalism case is profound, pressing, or mundane is
hard to define with any certainty. These—or any comparable set—of
standards can hardly decide all cases clearly. That said, they would provide
a marked improvement from the current guidelines; to recognize that
benefits would be limited is not to say they would not be meaningful.
This leads to the second problem with calls to improve the standards:
the Court may think trading away its vast discretion is too high a cost. As it
stands, the Court takes the cases it wants with very little risk of pushback,
largely because few people pay serious attention to certiorari decisions.
Promulgating new guidelines would draw unwelcome attention to the cert
stage. The Justices may feel pressure to take a case they would rather skip
simply because it conforms to the standard. Similarly, the Justices may want
to take a case that falls outside of newly announced parameters. Either way,
the Court would lose some control over its docket.
In return for this loss of control, it may get fewer petitions to work
through, which would save it some time and may boost the Court’s
legitimacy. However, as the Court has continued to reduce its caseload, the
time constraints bite less. What is more, if the new guidelines resulted in
piling additional cases onto the docket, the Justices would only be adding
more work to their schedule, not reducing their burdens. Further, drawing
attention to the docket might invite scrutiny and criticism rather than
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applause. For the Justices, clarifying the rules of certiorari appears to come
at too high a cost.
2. Increased Transparency
There have been occasional calls for the Court to explain its certiorari
decisions.248 The benefits of this proposal are, again, improved efficiency—
as the bar learns what is or is not certworthy—and enhanced legitimacy. The
mechanism is the same as before: clarity. One of the problems with clarified
rules or standards is that it is very hard to write down standards that are not
over- or underinclusive. This is a familiar problem to legal systems in
general. The common-law system addresses this problem by developing
case law. If the Court explained its decisions, it would develop a case law
for certiorari that lawyers could learn from as they do in any other body of
law. Further, the development of certiorari case law would signal that the
Court’s decision is judicial in nature. The opinions would show how the
Court grapples with its standards, and lawyers would be able to make
arguments that address the Court’s real concerns.
And yet one might be reasonably concerned that written orders denying
certiorari that were more than cursory could work mischief. The Court
would have to be very careful to avoid opining on the issues or facts
presented in the underlying litigation in a way that would affect future cases
on the merits. But it would be very hard for the Court to issue useful opinions
without engaging with the facts and issues of the instant case. The Court
would likely either say too much about the issues—possibly unintentionally
creating a strange type of precedent—or too little, which would mean that
the opinions would not provide enough information to future litigants.
Of course, such a concern would likely never arise in practice because,
given the thousands of petitions the Court reviews each term, the
requirement to explain the reasons why individual cases were rejected would
overwhelm the Court.249 Almost certainly, the Court would fall back on
summary opinions. The model here would be the traditional mandatory
jurisdiction where appeals that appeared to satisfy the formal jurisdictional
248
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requirements were dismissed “for lack of a substantive federal question.”250
Requiring a written opinion would invite similarly cursory and unhelpful
opinions, substantially eliminating any hope for a viable case law of
certiorari.
Another proposal to increase transparency is to release the Justices’
certiorari votes.251 From the perspective of a party petitioning the Court, it
would be useful to know which Justices have supported or opposed certiorari
in similar cases. Just as litigants target pivotal Justices on the merits, it would
be helpful to know which Justices will make or break a certiorari decision.
From the perspective of policy, releasing the votes would increase
legitimacy by promoting transparency and accountability. While per curiam
decisions are not uncommon, judicial decisions at all levels are signed. By
putting their names to their decisions, Justices publicly take responsibility
for their decisions. Since certiorari is an especially political decision—as it
is largely unconstrained by law, involves prioritizing competing policy
interests, and the Court issues no written opinions—accountability is
especially important.
This is a sensible suggestion with only manageable drawbacks. There
are real concerns that releasing the votes too quickly could adversely
influence ongoing litigation or add fuel to any fires lit in response to an
unpopular decision. Accordingly, the Court could release the certiorari votes
within a reasonable window of time—say, three years—after the end of the
underlying litigation. This window allows the Court to benefit from
increased transparency regarding cases that are still relevant without the risk
of tipping the Court’s hand in any litigation that is still ongoing in the lower
courts. Still, the Court is likely to push back against this proposal since it
would be “inconsistent with the long-standing and desirable custom of not
announcing the Conference vote on petitions for certiorari.”252
3. Changes to Voting Procedures
As detailed above, there are two particular voting procedures during
certiorari that are important. First, the Rule of Four sets the threshold that
separates the petitions that are dismissed from those that are granted. There
have occasionally been suggestions that the Court change the voting rule.
Justice Stevens, for instance, suggested turning the Rule of Four into a Rule
of Five,253 thereby applying the same majority rule at the certiorari stage and
at disposition. Enlarging the size of the minimal certiorari coalition would
presumably help the Court avoid taking cases that it should not. In general,
if one assumes that the more important the case the more likely each Justice
is to vote for certiorari, then petitions that garner four votes should, in
250
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expectation, be the least important cases and, presumably, the ones most
likely to turn out to be a waste of the Court’s time. With a minority-voting
rule, it is easier for marginally important cases to sneak onto the docket,
either because a few Justices misread the importance of the case, or because
a minority is stuffing the docket. Either way, requiring an additional vote to
grant certiorari would presumably filter out those cases the Court should not
take.
But moving to a majority rule is not an unalloyed good. Moving to a
majority rule at the agenda-setting stage would limit a minority coalition’s
ability to mitigate the ideological impact of the majority. Moving to a
majority rule makes it possible for the ideological majority to hold out for
only those cases that provide large ideological payoffs. The run-of-the-mill
cases where the Court is unanimous but the results do not promote the
majority’s ideological ends will have a hard time getting the Court’s
attention. If these are cases that are important for law on the ground, forgoing
them in favor of ideological wins would likely lead to bad public policy.
Moving to a majority rule would also make it easier for lower courts to
deviate from Court precedent. Recall that under Lax’s model, the Rule of
Four254 allows the four liberal Justices255 to monitor conservative lower
courts and punish deviations. Similarly, the four more conservative members
police liberal lower courts. The median would tolerate some deviations
because taking cases is costly, but the more extreme members are willing to
pay these costs. The Rule of Four creates a credible threat of overturning
lower courts which stray from the median’s preferred policy.
Further, increasing the size of the minimum cert coalition will reduce
the Court’s caseload even more.256 Along these same lines, it would
dramatically increase the power of the median Justice. Moving to a Rule of
Five would not make the Court less political; it would just mean the Court
largely represents the politics of the median Justice. If Lax’s model is
correct,257 lower courts could take advantage of this by deviating from Court
precedent in ways that would not draw the median’s attention.
Finally, increasing the size of the necessary coalition would almost
certainly reduce the size of the docket further while increasing the share of
divisive 5-4 cases. The Court is already taking an incredibly small—and
shrinking—number of cases.258 This has drawn the ire of many observers,
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and, over time, threatens the ability of the Court to play an active role in the
full scope of American law. Further, if the majority is holding out for big
ideological wins, we should expect them to pick cases that will split the
Court. Since the minority would no longer be able to add cases where the
Court is unanimous, a larger fraction of the cases would be divisive.
The Court could change the rule in the other direction and move to a
Rule of Three. This is not without precedent. In his testimony before the
Senate regarding the Judges’ Bill of 1925, Justice Van Devanter noted that
cert was sometimes granted if only three Justices were in favor.259 The Court
already grants cert with only three votes to grant if a fourth offers a Join-3,
and until the retirement of Justice Brennan, three Justices were sufficient to
force the Court to postpone decisions on certiorari pending the outcome of
another case.260
Moving to a Rule of Three would almost certainly increase the size of
the docket. If the Rule of Four became a Rule of Three, assuming no changes
to voting behavior,261 the Court would have taken another 148 cases during
the first eight years of the Rehnquist Court.262 That works out to be 18.5
additional cases a year.263 However, it is not entirely obvious if this would
resolve the problem of a politicized Court. In many ways, this path would
counter politics with more politics. The more extreme members of the usual
majority would be able to press the Court to take more cases that may shift
the law in their preferred direction. For the defensive-minded members of
the minority, on the other hand, a Rule of Three would make it easier to stuff
the docket full of unanimous cases or to better police deviations by lower
courts.
If the greater threat to the Court’s legitimacy is public perception of a
politicized court due to a surfeit of 5-4 cases, then a Rule of Three could
help. A Rule of Three makes these splits relatively less likely. Most of the
cases the defensive-minded minority coalition puts on the docket would
yield unanimity, which by the same logic should increase public confidence
in the Court. When an aggressive three-member coalition overreaches, it is
also more likely to lead to a 5-4 outcome than cases that already have four
votes. In the latter case, if the cert coalition gains one defector or if it merely
and 190 cases per year between 1971 and 1988, and between 69 and 92 cases per year between 1988 and
2016).
259
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keeps itself together, the result is a 5-4 case. In contrast, if three Justices
could grant cert, 5-4 cases at disposition only happen if one or two Justices
join the cert-granting minority. If the minority merely holds together, the
result is 5-4. This suggests that cases that reach the docket with minimal
support are less likely to lead to 5-4 outcomes under a Rule of Three than
under the Rule of Four.
The second voting rule that could change is the tradition of voting in
order of seniority, which appears to give the Chief Justice a first-mover
advantage and gives him a great deal of influence in the cert process.264 This
finding relates to other recent work that notes that the Chief’s influence is
often underestimated and may be unjustified.265 The particular advantage the
Chief has in agenda setting is that he votes first. Other Justices seem to queue
off of his vote, and as such, the Chief’s vote carries more weight than others.
One way to dilute this advantage would be to have the Justices vote
simultaneously. The problem with this procedure is that for it to be truly
effective, the Justices could not discuss the decision amongst themselves.
Discussions in conference are structured according to seniority, so the Chief
Justice speaks first.266 Even if the actual vote were simultaneous, the Chief
would retain a first-mover advantage by speaking first. Since the Court is a
deliberative body, it seems too high a price to pay to force it to not deliberate.
So long as the Justices vote sequentially, there will be an opportunity for
Justices to take cues from the first speaker. If simultaneous voting is off the
table, then cue taking will always be a concern. But steps could be taken to
minimize this danger by restructuring the discussion and voting process.
Social scientists are fond of a random recognition rule.267 If the Chief
randomly called on a Justice to begin (and then continue) conversation about
a petition, the first-mover advantage would be dispersed among the different
Justices. This would not cancel the advantage, though it would mean the
advantage would not be concentrated in the hands of the Chief. It would also
have the salutary benefit of inducing Justices to come prepared to discuss
every petition. As it stands, a Justice that is not up to speed on a case can
glean information from the Chief’s comments and free ride. If there were a
chance the Justice would have to begin the conversation, there would be
264
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additional incentive to carefully study the petition and come to an
independent conclusion before the conference. If the Justices were to do this,
they would likely form stronger prior beliefs about the petitions, and this
would limit the first-mover advantage.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to imagine Chief Justice Roberts managing
conferences with the aid of a randomization machine. Still, the Court already
has institutional structures that could be adapted to dilute the Chief’s
first-mover advantage. Justices are assigned managerial responsibilities over
different circuits.268 The Court could easily restructure discussion of cert
petitions so that the Justice that oversees the circuit where a case originates
begins the conversation. This would not end the first-speaker advantage, but
it would end the Chief’s monopoly on that advantage.269
4. Creating External Bodies to Review Petitions
From time to time, scholars have suggested creating an external body to
help manage the Court’s agenda-setting process. For example, Estreicher
and Sexton suggested a “second look mechanism.”270 Their concern was to
eliminate the cases from the docket that the Court should not take.271 Under
their proposal, the Court would vote first in conference, and any case
receiving four votes would be submitted to “an independent staff of the
caliber of the Justices’ clerks, headed by a leading senior member of the
Supreme Court bar.”272 Once vetted by that commission, the case would be
returned to the Court with the report of the commission, and the Justices
would vote a second time.273
Paul Carrington and Roger Cramton argue for a commission of thirteen
Article III judges empowered to “select[] . . . cases . . . that the Court would
be obliged to decide.”274 Their recommendation would require the Court to
take the cases referred by the commission. Sanford Levinson suggests
broadening the membership of this commission to include state judges and
public representatives.275 His view that the Court would be well served by
input from a broader range of views is well taken.
However, as Kathryn Watts had suggested, employing non-Article III
judges on such a commission would raise constitutional concerns about
268
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delegating government powers to nongovernmental actors or might violate
the “oneness” principle of Article III. 276 Further, a blunt legal requirement
that the Justices decide the cases selected by this commission prevents
Justices from weighing in, and denies the process the benefit of their
perspectives and their concerns for the Court as an institution.
If Carrington and Crampton’s proposal were amended to provide
recommendations instead of mandates, there would be fewer issues with
adding state judges, retired Justices, or others. The recommendations
themselves could then inform the Court’s internal deliberation on certiorari.
The commission’s work would save the Court time, as the cert pool would
largely become redundant. Further, by turning the cert process over to
professionals, the work should be done more efficiently and with less
concern that the recommendations reflect the idiosyncratic preferences of a
clerk two years removed from law school.277
The commission’s review of individual petitions would be made a
matter of public record. These reports would provide members of the
Supreme Court bar a wealth of information about what makes a case
certworthy. It may also have a beneficial effect of making frivolous appeals
less likely, as lawyers may be less inclined to recommend a costly certiorari
petition to a client when it is likely that the staff report will subsequently tell
the client that her attorney was wasting her money. Most importantly,
releasing these recommendations and reports promotes greater transparency.
Thus, the commission could achieve the benefits sought by reformers who
have called on the Court to clarify rules or explain cert decisions.
A public commission would add a great deal of transparency to the
process while reducing the amount of time Justices and clerks must spend
on reviewing cert petitions. This should increase the capacity of the Court to
take additional cases and increase the chances that the cases they do take
will not merely reflect the Justices’ ideological preferences. This
transparency would go a long way to reduce the danger of appearing biased
in taking cases.
CONCLUSION
The cert process is a hugely important but poorly understood part of the
Supreme Court as an institution. Currently, the Justices use this process to
advance their own ideological agendas. Over two-thirds of the Justices’
votes are attributable to ideology.278 However, Justices vary greatly in how
ideological they are. Further, there is strong, if only suggestive, evidence
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Watts, supra note 240, at 21 n.112.
Id. at 631–32.
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See supra Part II.D (discussing the impact of individual Justices’ ideology on the docket).
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that this could reflect a previously unrecognized power of the Chief Justice
to affect the docket.279
The politicization of the cert process undermines the Court’s legitimacy
and particularly its power of judicial review. Accordingly, the Article
proposes a novel solution to the problem: a First Look Commission that
would make recommendations to the Court as to which cases to take and
help Congress better use its Article III power over the Court’s jurisdiction.

279

See supra Part II.E (discussing the power of the Chief Justice to shape the law).
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX
The model I propose is a generalization of the traditional rollcall voting
framework. Justices are ݅  אሼͳǡʹǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ܫሽ and cases are ݆  אሼͳǡʹǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ܬሽ. First,
let ݖǡ be Justice ݅’s vote at cert in case ݆. Let ߱ be a vector of case-specific
covariates and ߚ be a vector of Justice-specific coefficients. Justices vary in
how much they dislike taking cases in two ways. First, taking any case
imposes a cost of ߙ on Justice ݅. Second, Justices have differing thresholds,
ߣ , for moving from a Join-3 to a full grant. Finally, let ߢ be the common
payoff from case ݆ across all Justices.
The substantive interpretations of these values are that more negative
values of ߙ imply Justices prefer to take fewer cases, higher values of ߣ are
associated with a Justice being more liberal with using Join-3 votes as a tool,
and ߢ is the intrinsic certworthiness of a case recognized by all Justices.
Including the product of Justice-specific coefficients and case-specific
covariates, ߚ ߱ allows Justices to have idiosyncratic differences in their
views of what makes a case certworthy. For instance, ߢ will capture the
average certworthiness of a death penalty case, but the interaction term ߱ߚ ٹ
will allow Justice Marshall to place greater weight on death penalty cases
than some other Justices.
Payoffs from ideology are modeled as follows. Judicial decision-making
from the cert stage through the dispositional stage is a two-stage game. In
the first round, the Court collectively decides to grant or deny certiorari. If
the Justices grant cert, the Court decides the case in stage two. The important
assumption is that Justices share a common view of what is likely to happen
at the second stage.
Suppose the lower courts are split on an issue, and the rule applied in a
given case is a random draw from a commonly known distribution ݂௧ ሺߦ ሻ


with finite mean and variance ߤ and ߪଶ , respectively. Further, assume
that Justices share a common belief that, if they Court takes the case, the
majority will issue a new rule ߰ that lower courts will subsequently apply
by drawing policies from some known distribution ݃௧ ሺ߰ ሻ with mean and
ௌ

variance ߤௌ and ߪଶ .
Making the standard assumption that Justices face quadratic losses,
suppose the expected ideological payoff to Justice ݅ if the Court takes case ݆
is
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ͳ
ሿ ൌ න െ ሺ߰ െ ߠ ሻଶ ݃௧ ሺ߰ ሻ݀߰
ஏ ʹ

ͳ
ൌ െ න ሺ߰ଶ  ߠଶ െ ʹ߰ ߠ ሻ݃௧ ሺ߰ ሻ݀߰
ʹ ஏ

ͳ
ൌ െ ߠଶ െ ʹߠ න ߰ ݃௧ ሺ߰ ሻ݀߰  න ߰ଶ ݃௧ ሺ߰ ሻ݀߰
ʹ
ஏ
ஏ
ͳ ଶ
ௌ
ൌ െ ሺߠ െ ʹߠ ߤ  ܭௌ ሻ
ʹ
ͳ
ൌ െ ሺߠଶ  ܭௌ ሻ െ ߠ ߤௌ
ʹ
where ܭௌ ൌ ධ ߰ଶ ݃௧ ሺ߰ ሻ݀߰ ൌ ߪଶ
ஏ

ௌ

ௌ

 ߤଶ .

Since by definition the majority policy prevails at the second stage, the
decision Justices face at cert is between the expected payoff just recovered
and the value of the current state of affairs. The expected utility from
maintaining the current state of the law is
ͳ
ሿ ൌ න െ ሺߦ െ ߠ ሻଶ ݂௧ ሺߦ ሻ݀ߦ
ஆ ʹ
ͳ
ൌ െ ሺߠଶ  ܭ ሻ െ ߠ ߤ
ʹ


ൌ ධ ߦଶ ݂௧ ሺߦ ሻ݀ߦ ൌ ߪଶ  ߤଶ .
ௗ௬

ܧሾܸǡ

where ܭ

ஆ

I can now apply the standard random utility framework and write down
an individual Justice’s utility functions as
௧

ܷǡ

ௗ௬

ܷǡ

௧

ൌ ܧሾܸǡ

௧

ሿ  ߙ  ߢ  ߱ߚ ٹ െ ߳ǡ
ௗ௬

ൌ ܧሾܸǡ

ௗ௬

ሿ െ ߳ǡ

I now operationalize this model similar to Clinton et al. (2004).280

280

data).

See Clinton et al., supra note 25 (using congressional votes for statistical analysis of rollcall
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ௗ௬

െ ܷǡ

ͳ
௧
ൌ ൫ܭ െ ܭௌ ൯  ߢ  ߙ  ߱ߚ ٹ  ߠ ൫ߤ െ ߤௌ ൯  ߳ǡ
ʹ
௧
ൌ Ȧ  ߙ  ߱ߚ ٹ  ߠ ൫ߤ െ ߤௌ ൯  ߳ǡ
̱

௧
ൌ Ȧ  ߙ  ߱ߚ ٹ െ ߠ ܩ  ߳ǡ


ଵ

ௌ



ௌ

Ȧ ൌ ଶ ሺܭ െ ܭௌ ሻ  ߢ ൌ ሺߤଶ െ ߤଶ ሻ  ሺߪଶ െ ߪଶ ሻ 

where

௧
௧
ߢ , ܩ ൌ ߤௌ െ ߤ , and ߳ǡ
ࣨ ሺͲǡͳሻ is a policy shock where ߳ǡ
ൌ
ௗ௬

߳ǡ

௧

െ ߳ǡ

.

څ
,
The following model simply says that when the latent variable ݖǡ
which represents the expected net payoff from taking a case, is negative, the
Justice will vote to deny. If the payoff is sufficiently high enough, the Justice
will vote to grant. If the latent variable is between zero and the floor for a
grant, the Justice will vote to Join-3.

Model 1
௧
ݖǡ

Ͳሺݕ݊݁ܦሻǡ
ൌ ൞ ͳሺ͵݊݅ܬሻǡ
ʹሺݐ݊ܽݎܩሻǡ

څ
൏Ͳ
݂݅ݖǡ
څ
݂݅Ͳ  ݖǡ ൏ ߣ
څ
݂݅ݖǡ
 ߣ

څ
Notice the substantive impact of the Ȧ term in equation for ݖǡ
above.
First, when ߢ is large and a case is intrinsically more certworthy, the Justice
is more likely to vote to take the case. When the lower courts are generally
confused about the law, they have a higher variance, which increases ܭ
and through that Ȧ . This makes every Justice more likely to vote to take a
case. Similarly, when Justices are confident they can predict the outcome of
the case, they are more willing, ceteris paribus, to take the case, because the
ௌ
variance ߪଶ is smaller. This difference in variance nicely represents the
Court’s concern with circuit splits and its desire to take cases where it can
bring clarity.
For the analysis in the Article, the relevant term is ܩ ൌ ߤௌ െ ߤ ,
which is the signed distance between the mean of the two distributions, ߰
and ߦ . If ܩ  Ͳ, then the expected policy that results from taking the case
is to the right of the current law.
I estimate Model 1 in a standard Bayesian framework using a Gibbs
sampler. After a burn-in of 1,000 runs, I collect 200 draws from the relevant
posteriors by running the sampler 2,000 additional times and thinning every
څ
ten. At each iteration, I save the value of all components of ݖǡ
.
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I generate results in Part I.C by looking first at the sum of the ideological
̱

ٹ
ߚǡௗ െ ߠ ܩ , where the ideological variables are
parameters, ߱ǡௗ
Blackmun’s clerks’ recommendations, the product of the Justices’ ideal
points, and the case-specific gap parameter. If that sum is negative, then the
purely ideological Justice votes to deny. If it is positive, the purely
ideological Justice votes in favor of cert. Note that for this analysis, a Join3 is treated as a vote to grant. Similarly, if the nonideological components
are negative, a Justice that does not care about ideology votes to deny, but if
they are positive, the Justice who does not care about ideology would vote
to grant. If both components are greater (less) than zero, then the Justice’s
vote is overdetermined. If the ideology part correctly predicts the vote and
the nonideological part does not, then ideology is necessary to predict the
vote. If ideology alone gets it wrong but the non-ideological factors get it
right, then case importance is necessary to predict the vote. If a case is
overdetermined, then both ideological and importance factors are sufficient
to predict the vote.
For Part I.D, I run the model on all cases and subset the results into two
groups: memo recommends grant; recommends deny. The figure shows the
average value of ܩ for each of the 200 draws from the sampler for the two
subsets.
For Part I.E, the analysis is the same but with different subsets. The first
chart shows the average ܩ value for cases actually granted and denied. Later
figures show the average values for granted and denied subsets of cases the
clerks recommended granting and denying, respectively.
For Part I.F, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s votes enter the model as data. If
Rehnquist voted to deny, then the variable takes on a value of -1. If he voted
to Join-3 or to Grant, the variable takes on a value of 1. I then re-run model
1, but this time instead of Rehnquist’s votes being a dependent variable, they
are part of the data, ߱ . The model returns results based on the votes of the
other eight Justices. The figure shows the coefficient on the Rehnquist-vote
variable for the other Justices. To calculate how many votes changed
consistent with Rehnquist’s vote, I predict every Justice’s vote in every case
using the full model and again after subtracting off the product of the
Justice’s Rehnquist-vote coefficient and the value of Rehnquist’s vote (േͳሻ.
I compare the proportion of correctly predicted votes from each set of
predictions and report the results.

